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Resolving Conflicting International Data
Privacy Rules in Cyberspace
Joel R. Reidenberg*
International flows ofpersonal information on the Internet challenge the
protection of data privacy and force divergent national policies and rules to
confront each other. While core principles for the fair treatment of personal
information are common to democracies, privacy rights vary considerably
across national borders. This article explores the divergences in approach and
substance of data privacy between Europe and the United States. Professor
Reidenberg argues that the specific privacy rules adopted in a country have a
governance function. The article shows that national differences support two
distinct political choices for the roles in democratic society assigned to the
state, the market and the individual: either liberal, market-based governance
or socially-protective, rights-based governance. These structural divergences
make international cooperation imperative for effective data protection in cy-
berspace. Professor Reidenberg postulates that harmonization of the specific
rules for the treatment ofpersonal information will be harmful for the political
balance adopted in any country and offers, instead, a conceptual frameworkfor
coregulation of information privacy that can avoid confrontations over govern-
ance choices. The theory articulates roles for institutional players, technical
codes, stakeholder summits and eventually a treaty-level "General Agreement
on Information Privacy" to develop mutually acceptable implementations of the
universally accepted core principles. The article concludes with a taxonomy of
strategies and partners to develop international cooperation and achieve a high
level ofprotectionforpersonal information in international data transfers.
* Professor of Law and Director of the Graduate Program, Fordham University School of
Law. A.B., Dartmouth; J.D., Columbia; D.E.A., Univ. de Paris I-Sorbonne. For provoking my
early thoughts on this article at the 20'h International Conference of Data Protection Authorities, I
thank Juan Manuel Fernandez Lopez, Director of the Spanish Data Protection Agency. For their
discussion and insights on earlier portions and drafts of this article, I thank Anne Carblanc, Richard
Camell, Julie Cohen, Jill Fisch, Robert Gellman, Robert Kaczorowski, Mark Patterson, Russell
Pearce, Charles Raab, Paul Schwartz, and Steve Thel. Work on this paper was supported in part by
a Fordham Law School Faculty Summer Research Grant Award and benefited from my colleagues'
discussion at the Fordham Faculty Workshop. All opinions, errors, omissions, and misunderstand-
ings remain my own. All Internet citations were current as of May 22, 2000. Copyright © 2000 by
Joel R. Reidenberg and the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University.
1315
HeinOnline  -- 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1315 1999-2000
STANFORD LA WREVIEW
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 1316
I. DATA FLOW CHARACTERISTICS ..................................................................... 1320
A. Clickstream Data ................................................................................. 1320
B. "Multinational Sourcing ........................................................................ 1322
C. Data Warehousing and Data Creep ..................................................... 1323
D. Pressures for Secondary Use and Profiling ......................................... 1324
11. INTERNATIONAL DATA PRIVACY PRINCIPLES ................................................ 1325
A. Convergence on First Principles ......................................................... 1325
B. Divergence on Execution ..................................................................... 1330
1. Implementation ............................................................................. 1330
2. Interpretation ................................................................................ 1332
III. ONLINE CONFRONTATION AND CONFLICTS .................................................. 1336
A. Implementation and Systemic Legal Conflict ....................................... 1337
B. Interpretation and Detail Conflict ....................................................... 1338
C. Compliance and Conflict ..................................................................... 1338
IV. GOVERNANCE CHOICES AND INFORMATION PRIVACY LAWS ....................... 1339
A. The Normative Role of Privacy in Democratic Governance ................ 1340
B. Liberal Norms and Data Privacy ......................................................... 1342
C. Social-Protection Norms and Data Privacy ........................................ 1347
V. COREGULATION OF INFORMATION PRIVACY IN CYBERSPACE ....................... 1351
A. Key Intergovernmental Players ........................................................... 1352
1. Reawakening of institutions .......................................................... 1352
2. New entrants ................................................................................. 1353
B. Technical Codes of Conduct ................................................................ 1355
C. Multistakeholder Summits .................................................................... 1358
D. GeneralAgreement on Information Privacy ........................................ 1359
VI. STRATEGIES FOR CO-ORDINATION AND COOPERATION ................................ 1362
A. Political Dimensions ............................................................................ 1362
B. Roles of Data Protection Commissions ................................................ 1364
1. Emissary strategy .......................................................................... 1364
2. Advocacy strategy ......................................................................... 1366
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................... 1370
INTRODUCTION
The robust development of the Internet and online services over the last
several years represent the most significant era for international flows of per-
sonal information since the first wave of computerization in the 1970s.
During the early days of data processing, fears of omnipotent and omnipres-
ent collections of personal information were largely conceived in terms of
centralized computing and foreign data havens akin to tax havens.' Until the
I. See, e.g., ANDRt LUCAS, LE DROIT DE L'INFORMATIQUE 67 (1987) (describing the fear of
data havens); PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMM'N, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION
SOCIETY (1977) (expressing concern about intrusions into personal privacy by government and
[VoI. 52:13151316
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personal computer revolution, large scale processing of personal information
was generally reserved to institutions with centralized databases.2 The Inter-
net and personal computers, however, multiply the number of participants
generating and using personal information in a way that was unimaginable a
generation ago. Every personal computer, Internet service provider, and
Web site can now create, collect, and process personal information. Al-
though cross-border transfers of data have been occurring for many years,
the growth trends in Internet data transfers reflect both a quantitative and
qualitative shift.3
In particular, the dramatic growth of Internet services during the last sev-
eral years and the decentralization of information processing arrangements
have exponentially increased the flow of personal information across na-
tional borders. From the processing of German railway card data in the
United States4 to the sale of French gastronomic products through the Hong
Kong Web site of March6 de France,5 personal data is driving the global
economy and fair information practices have never been more important for
the protection of citizens. In the United States, the sale of personal informa-
tion alone was estimated at $1.5 billion in 19976 and confidence in the fair
treatment of personal information is at a critical juncture.7 Governments
around the world have unequivocally declared that the future protection of
large corporations); Arthur R. Miller, Personal Privacy in the Computer Age: 7he Challenge of a
New Technology in an Information-Oriented Society, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1089, 1107-27 (1969)
(identifying concerns regarding centralized processing ofinformation about individuals).
2. See, e.g., Colin J. Bennett, Convergence Revisited: Toward a Global Policyfor the Protec-
tion of Personal Data?, in TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE 99-103 (Philip E.
Agre & Marc Rotenberg eds., 1997) (noting that the development of global networks has exacer-
bated privacy concerns); Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, GenerationalDevelopment ofData Protection
in Europe, in TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE 219, 225 (Philip E. Agre &
Marc Rotenberg eds., 1997) (noting that "minicomputers" allowed small organizations to use de-
centralized data processing).
3. See Frederick Schauer, Internet Privacy and the Public-Private Distinction, 38
JURIMETRICS J. 555, 557-61 (1998) (arguing that the Internet creates a quantitative and qualitative
change in privacy).
4. See Alexander Dix, The German Railway Card: A Model Contractual Solution of the
"Adequate Level of Protection " Issue?, PROC. XVIII INT'L CONF. DATA PROT. CoMM',S (1996)
<http://ww.datenschutz-berlin.de/sonstigekonferen/ottawa/alex3.htm> (describing a data protec-
tion agreement between the German railway and Citibank).
5. See Ie Marchd de France <http.//195.114.67.153/Cgi-bin/ncomnmerce/ExecMacro/lemarche>;
see also Serge Gauthronet & Fredric Nathan, On-line Services and Data Protection and the Pro-
tection ofPrivacy 50-51 (1998) [hereinafter On-line Services] <http://europa.eu.int/comn/intemal
market/en/media/dataprot/studies/serven.pdf> (explaining the international architecture of the com-
pany's Web site).
6. See Trans Union Corp., F.T.C. No. 9255 354 (July 31, 1998) <http:llwww.fRc.gov/os/
l998/9808/d9255pub.id.pdf> (estimating the sale of personal information in 1997).
7. See Joel R. Reidenberg & Frangoise Gamet-Pol, The Fundamental Role of Privacy and
Confidence in the Netw'ork 30 WARE FOREST L. REV. 105, 106 (1995) (discussing the transforma-
tive impact of new information technology on economic, political, and social organization).
May 2000] 1317
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citizen privacy is essential to the robust development of electronic com-
merce.8
At the same time, however, privacy rights for personal information vary
considerably across national borders.9 The United States, for example, has a
market-dominated policy for the protection of personal information and only
accords limited statutory and common law rights to information privacy.O In
contrast, European norms reflect a rights-dominated approach and the Euro-
pean Union now requires each of its Member States to have comprehensive
statutory protections for citizens.II International data flows on the Internet,
whether for execution of transactions or intracorporate data management,
force these divergent data protection policies and rules to confront each other
with ever greater frequency.12 Indeed, the Internet and electronic commerce
8. See generally OECD Ministerial Conference Conclusions: "A Borderless World: Realising
the Potential of Global Electronic Commerce," ORG. Ec. COOPERATION DEV. (OECD) Doc.
SG/EC(98)14/FINAL Ann. HI (1998) <http:/wwr.olis.oecd.orglolis/l1998doc.nsf/4cf568b5b90
dad994125671bOO4bed59188e869fb73a5a5eOc12566deOO4ec962$FILEI12E81007.ENG> [herein-
after A Borderless World] (noting determination of OECD to work with international agreements
and businesses to protect data privacy); A European Initiative in Electronic Commerce: Communi-
cation to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the
Committee of the Regions <http:lwww.ispo.cee.beEcommerce/legalldocumentslcom97-157/
ecomcom.pdf> [hereinafter European Initiative in Electronic Commerce] (noting the need to pro-
tect personal data privacy to help advance electronic commerce in Europe); THE WHITE HOUSE, A
Framework for Global Electronic Commerce (July 1, 1997) <http://www.ecommerce.gov/
framewrk.htm> (discussing e-commerce development and privacy in the United States).
9. I will use the terms "data privacy," "information privacy," "data protection," and "fair in-
formation practices" interchangeably. For a discussion of privacy terminology, see PAUL M.
SCHVARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW: A STUDY OF UNITED STATES DATA
PROTECTION 5-6 (1996).
10. See FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 101-32 (1997) (noting that the
U.S. government should play a limited role in protecting data but should articulate broad principles
to guide industry); PETER P. SwIRE & ROBERT E. LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS: WORLD DATA
FLOWS, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, AND THE EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION DIRECTIVE 2-3 (1998)
(arguing that there is a potential for significant economic conflict between Europe and the United
States if the gulf in data privacy protection is not bridged). See generally COLIN 3. BENNETT,
REGULATING PRIVACY: DATA PROTECTION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED
STATES (1992) (comparing the American self-regulation model with the more ambitious state-
sponsored protections provided in Sweden, West Germany, and Britain); SCHvWARTZ &
REIDENBERG, supra note 9 (comparing relative levels of data protection provided in the United
States and Europe).
11. See generally Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and
on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.L(L 281) 31 <http://europa.eu.int/eur-lexlen/lif/dat
1995/en_395L0046.html [hereinafter European Data Protection Directive] (setting out the stan-
dards for implementation in each of the 15 Member States of the European Union).
12. See Paul M. Schwartz, European Data Protection Law and Restrictions on International
Data Flows, 80 IOWA L. REv. 471 (1995) (noting the significant challenges to the flow of data
between the United States and Europe in the context of European data protection laws and the "data
embargo order').
1318 [Vol. 52:1315
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raise the stakes for individuals, businesses and government. In the absence
of coherent privacy protection, data flow embargoes are increasingly likely.13
Part I of this article defines characteristics of information flows on the
Internet that challenge the protection of information privacy and set the stage
for serious confrontation between different national and transnational data
protection standards. Part II identifies a core set of principles for fair infor-
mation practice that is common to strong democracies. While an interna-
tional consensus exists on the basic standards for the fair treatment of
personal information, significant differences in both approach and substance
persist, particularly between Europe and the United States.14 Part III shows
that the characteristics of information flows and these differences result in
serious conflict between normative data protection objectives around the
world.' 5
Part IV of the article argues that the specific privacy rules in any par-
ticular country have a governance function reflecting the country's choices
regarding the roles of the state, market, and individual in the country's
democratic structure. Under this governance theory of privacy, national dif-
ferences derive from distinct visions of governance, and privacy rules strive
to protect a state's norm of governance, whether it be a liberal market norm
13. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 9, at 380-81 (noting that national laws in
most European Union Member States permitted blocking data transfers if the destination has insuf-
ficient privacy standards and the European Data Protection Directive requires blocking).
14. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS, RECORDS, COMPUTERS AND THE RIGHTS OF
CITIZENS (1973) [hereinafter H.E.W. GUIDELINES] (advising a complete set of rights of citizens
with respect to the computerized processing of their personal information); Consumer Privacy on
the World Wide Web: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm., Trade and Consumer Protec-
lion of the House Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong. (July 21, 1998) <http:Avwwv.ftc.gov/osl1998/
9807/privac98.htm> (prepared statement of Robert Pitofsky, Chairman of the FTC) (describing the
FTC's position on the privacy protections necessary for American citizens); European Data Pro-
tection Directive, supra note 11 (setting out privacy standards for the 15 Member States of the
European Union); Council of Europe (COE), Convention for the Protection of Individuals with
Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981, 20 I.L.M. 377 (1981) [hereinafter
COE Convention] (defining the standards for adoption by signatory countries to the international
treaty); OECD, Guidelines on Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Per-
sonal Data, Sept. 23, 1980, 20 I.L.M. 422 (1981) <http:/coe.fr.englleglatxt/108e.htm> [hereinafter
OECD Guidelines] (recommending a set of standards for adoption in member countries). See gen-
erally BENNETT, supra note 10 (explaining different solutions to privacy protection in different
countries); DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PROTECTING PRIVACY IN SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES: THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, SWEDEN, FRANCE, CANADA, AND THE UNITED STATES (1989)
(critiquing the differences in government data protection); SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note
9 (comparing U.S. law and practice to European standards and finding important differences);
ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967) (describing perspectives on privacy from differ-
ent cultures).
15. See generally SCHVARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 9 (analyzing the differences be-
tween the U.S. and European approaches and standards); SWIRE & LITAN, supra note 10 (arguing
for confrontational differences between the United States and Europe); Joel R. Reidenberg, The
Privacy Obstacle Course: Hurdling Barriers to Transnational Financial Services, 60 FORDHAM L.
REV. S137, S148-60 (1992) (describing differences between ad hoe and omnibus approaches).
1319May 2000]
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or a socially-protective, citizen's rights norm. This insight means that efforts
to harmonize specific standards would conflict with the way any given model
embodies a market-based or a rights-based philosophy of governance.
If the harmonization of privacy rules is, thus, harmful for the political
balance adopted in any country, then the peaceful coexistence of different
privacy rules becomes essential to avoid online confrontations. Part V pres-
ents a theory for the coregulation of information privacy that identifies key
institutional players and mechanisms to minimize regulatory conflict. And
finally, Part VI offers short- and long-term strategies for coordination and
cooperation among different privacy regimes. The article concludes with a
discussion of the effect that this coregulation might have on the governance
norms that posed the original conflicts.
I. DATA FLOW CHARACTERISTICS
On the Internet, four characteristics frame the international transfer of
personal information. These characteristics reflect a trend that marks dra-
matically increased capacity and incentives to abuse personal information
across national borders. The salient points range from the actual uses of de-
ployed technologies (specifically, collecting clickstream information and
multinational processing) to the commercial incentives that drive the proc-
essing of personal information (notably, data warehousing and profiling).
Taken together, these characteristics set the stage for intense conflicts over
information privacy.
A. Clickstream Data
In a network environment, every click of a computer's mouse leaves a
data trace.16 This "clickstream data" is far more robust than the typical
"transaction data" from an electronic payment or telephone call. "Transac-
tion data" typically contain discrete information on the parties, date, time and
type of transaction.17 In contrast, by its very nature, the clickstream reflects
16. For useful illustrations, examine the cookies.txt files, the .hst files or the cache subdirec-
tory files on any personal computer. The cookies.txt files contain information about actions taken
by a user at specific websites. See Persistent Client State HTTP Cookies <http://home.netscape.
comfnewsreffstd/cookiespec.html> (describing information that can be stored on a client's hard
drive when he connects to a server). The .hst files contain the addresses of all recently visited web-
sites accessed by the personal computer and the cache subdirectory contains copies of the Web
pages and images recently viewed on the personal computer. Often, similar data reflecting a user's
activities will be hidden on the hard drive. See Peter H. Lewis, What's on YourHard Drive?, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 8, 1998, at GI (noting that people may be unaware that sensitive and embarassing files
may be found on their computers).
17. See, e.g., Implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Telecommunications
Carriers' Use of Customer Proprietary Network Information and other Customer Information, Sec-
ond Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, CC Docket No. 96-115, FCC
1320 [Vol. 52:1315
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not just the existence of interactions, but also includes the content of those
interactions; every keystroke is included in the clickstream and not just the
fact that an interaction took place. The clickstream information provides
continuous, recordable surveillance of individuals and all of their activities.
This clickstream information is increasingly sought. For example, soft-
ware is now readily available and used to establish monitoring programs for
clickstream data in the workplace.t8 As the Internet economy moves society
from an economy of mass production to mass customization, transaction-
generated information becomes an integral part of the process to predict and
modify consumer behavior.19 On the Internet, most websites collect some
clickstream data in the form of log files.20 These log files routinely collect
the Internet addresses of visitors browsing the site and record the Web pages
that the visitors read.21 Internet service providers similarly can record logs of
all subscribers' interactions, but, for the moment, are unlikely to retain the
clickstream information. The sheer volume of such records exceeds the use-
fulness for Internet service providers. Nevertheless, advertising arrange-
ments on the Internet seek to recapture the attributes of the clickstream data
that the online service providers forgo. Companies such as DoubleClick22
98-27 (rel. Feb. 26, 1998) <http:llwww.fcc.gov/BureausCommonCarrier/Ordersl1998/fc98027.
txt>; NATIONAL TELECOMM. AND INFO. ADMIN. (NTIA), U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PRIVACY
AND THE Nil: SAFEGUARDING TELECOMMUNICATIONS-RELATED PERSONAL INFORMATION (1995)
<http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/privwhitepaper.html> (describing the ease with which transac-
tion data can be accessed by private individuals).
18. For example, a product called Surf Control Scout is designed to show employers "'who's
doing what and when."' Surf Control Scout Corp., Internet Monitoring and Reporting <http://
www.surfeontrol.comfproducts/index.html>. There is even a monitoring product offered to net-
work administrators that is called "Little Brother." See Kansmen Corp., Kansmen Corporation
Announces LittleBrother 2.0, Oct. 22, 1997 <http://www.littlebrother.com/products/lb/pr.htm>.
Nearly two-thirds of U.S. employers report that they implement employee surveillance programs.
See AMERICAN MGMT. ASS'N INT'L, 1997 AMA SURVEY: ELECTRONIC MONITORING &
SURVEILLANCE 1 (1997) <http:llwww.amanet.orglsurvey/elec97.htm>.
19. See Rohan Samarajiva, Interactivity as though Privacy Mattered, in TECHNOLOGY AND
PRIVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE, supra note 21, at 277-81 (discussing the trend toward mass cus-
tomization and the threat it poses to personal privacy).
20. See Joseph I. Rosenbaum, Privacy on the Internet: Whose Information Is it Anyway?, 38
JURIMETRICS 3.565,571-572 (1998) (discussing how the Internet contributes to the "dossier effect"
in which large amounts of small pieces of information about individuals are amassed). See gener-
ally lean-Marc Dinant, es traitenents invisibles sur Internet (June 1998) <http://www.droit.findp.
ac.be/cridleclip/Iuxembourg.html> (describing hidden collections of personal information on the
Interet).
21. Network operating software can be configured to record the log files as a default. System
operators must affirmatively disable the feature. See Cliff Wootton, Analyzing Log Files, WEB
DEVELOPER'S J. <http://www.webdevelopersjoumal.com/arficles/loganalysis.html>.
22. DoubeClick's Web site is located at <http://www.doubleclick.com>.
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propose through the use of "cookies" technology to track Internet users'
browsing patterns across many websites.23
In effect, clickstream data offer a quantitative leap forward in the amount
of personal information in circulation.24 At the same time, the surveillance
aspect of clickstream data is also qualitatively different from earlier forms of
transaction data. The detail offers a picture that was previously not readily
compiled. While the depth of information available from clickstream data
might have been obtainable with a private investigator recording an individ-
ual's every move, such surveillance would have been treated as harassment.
In the past, privacy was preserved from the isolation of discrete bits of in-
formation. The difficulty in assembling such information provided protec-
tion to individuals.25 Clickstream data break down this protection.
B. Multinational Sourcing
The Internet and emerging electronic commerce activities encourage
multinational sourcing of information.26 The entire architecture of the Inter-
net is based on the principle of geographic indeterminacy. The information
processing capabilities of the network were designed to make distance and
geographic location irrelevant. As a result, servers and processing arrange-
ments migrate; data may be stored in one location and readily shifted to an-
other location just as transmission and computing resources may be moved
instantaneously from one place to another27 Corporate intranets, built using
some of the same technology as the Internet, have adopted the same fea-
tures.28 Data may be collected in one location, processed elsewhere, and
23. See DoubleClick Privacy Statement <http'//www.doubleclick.com/privacy policyk (de-
scribing the company's policy regarding information collection and use); On-line Services, supra
note 5, at 80-95 (discussing DoubleClick's development, operation, and data protection practices).
24. See Schauer, supra note 3, at 557-59 (discussing the quantitative increase in data avail-
ability).
25. See id. at 559 (noting that modem information technology allows access to information
previously unavailable).
26. See, e.g., OECD, THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACTS OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE:
PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND RESEARCH AGENDA Chap. 3 (1999) <http://wwV.oecd.org/subject/
e._commerce/summary.htm> [hereinafter IMPACTS OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE]; Communication
from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Commit-
tee and the Committee of the Regions, in GOBALISATION AND THE INFORMATION SOCIETY: THE
NEED FOR STRENGTHENED INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION COM(98)50 § 2.1 <http.//europa.eu.
int/comm/dg03/publicat/commstinfosoclomiscen.pdf> (discussing the growth of global electronic
commerce).
27. See CATE supra note 10, at 10 (discussing the original ARPANET and how it "encour-
aged the creation of multiple links among the computers on the network"); IMPACTS OF
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, supra note 26, at 79 (discussing technology diffusion and interfinm col-
laboration as changes brought about by the growth of electronic commerce).
28. See generally Deborah Asbrand, Banking on Intranet Training: Citibank's Net Division
Delivers Soft Skills and Technology with Online Training Courses, INTRANET 3., Aug. 23, 1999
1322 [Vol. 52:1315
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stored at yet another site. In addition, the open architecture also means that
multiple intermediaries have access to and may process data in transit.29 For
example, third-party data collectors, such as Internet advertising companies
like DoubleClick, obtain and pass on information about other websites' visi-
tors. These arrangements radically increase the complexity of data process-
ing and obscure the responsibility for data protection.
C. Data Warehousing and Data Creep
With the costs of computing and storage diminishing rapidly, isolated
bits of data that in the past were useless or too expensive to process may now
be collected and retained.30 Since information will always have value in an
"Information Society," the almost zero cost of processing incremental bits of
data offers a powerful incentive for "data warehousing." "Data warehous-
ing" is the stockpiling of millions of bits of personal information for future
analysis. While each isolated piece of information may have little meaning
or risk minimal potential harm to the individual, the aggregate collection
takes on an entirely different character. Analyzing the aggregate can reveal
patterns of behavior, profiles, and an intimate slice of the lives of individuals,
which can be used to categorize and segregate individuals in society.31
"Data creep" is closely related to data warehousing. "Data creep" repre-
sents the "more is better" school of thought.32 More and more bits of per-
sonal information are sought because of a vague belief that somehow the
<http:l/www.intraneqoumal.com/deploymentweb_trainingO82399.html> (describing Citibank's
use of Web technology for intranet development).
29. See IMPACTS OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, supra note 26, at 79-103 (addressing the
changing business models and market structures).
30. See, e.g., CARL SHAPIRO & HALR. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE
TO THENETWoRK ECONOMY 33-34, 36-37 (1999) (discussing the collection of consumer informa-
tion); PRIVACY WORKING GROUP, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PRIVACY AND THE NATIONAL
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: PRINCIPLES FOR PROVIDING AND USING PERSONAL INFORMA-
TION 6 (1995) <http://www.ittf.nistgov/documents/committee/nfopolniiprivprinfmal.html>
("[B]ecause the costs associated with storing, processing, and distributing personal records are
continuously decreasing, accumulating personal information from disparate sources will become a
cost-effective enterprise for information users with interests ranging from law enforcement to direct
marketing.").
31. See Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1193, 123941 (1998) (discussing the construction and economic value of detailed personal profiles
to database marketing firms).
32. "Data creep" is analogous to "function creep." In political science terms, "function creep"
describes the tendencies of bureaucracies to gradually expand their functions or missions. "Data
creep" is the tendency to continually expand the scope of collection and use of personal informa-
tion. See, e.g., Samarajiva, supra note 19, at 301 (noting the .'creeping' redesign of public tele-
communication networks throughout the world to include covert surveillance capabilities").
1323May 2000]
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information will have use. 33 Since the cost to collect and process informa-
tion has dropped and the push for data warehousing has grown, more seem-
ingly innocuous information is collected from individuals for storage and
future processing. For example, companies now ask for a customer's zip
code even if the purchase transaction is conducted with cash.34 A company
does not need the customer's zip code to process cash transactions. But, the
zip code offers a key piece of data to generate demographic profiles. By ag-
gregating innocuous information or seemingly anonymous data, the con-
struction of detailed individual profiles becomes routine.
D. Pressures for Secondary Use and Profiling
The ease of collecting and storing personal information coupled with an
enhanced capability to use it create tremendous commercial pressures in fa-
vor of unanticipated or secondary uses.35 U.S. industry has a long and en-
trenched tradition of surreptitious and secondary use of personal
information.36 These diverted uses of collected personal information can
generate additional value. In the name of efficiency, an existing pool of per-
sonal information becomes an attractive source of data for new uses.37 This
diversion of personal information is particularly acute with respect to profil-
ing. Something as routine as a magazine subscription becomes the basis for
a detailed profile of interests. Once a substantial database exists, the ability
to profile individuals within the database becomes easier and more valu-
able.38
33. See Kang, supra note 31, at 1239 ("A sophisticated database marketing initiative thus ac-
quires as much data on potential customers as legally possible.").
34. Staples, the office supply store chain, routinely asks customers for their zip code. The
cashiers at Office Max, a competing chain, cannot process credit card transactions without storing a
digital image of the customer's signature unless the manager intervenes.
35. See Adam L. Penenberg, On the Web, No One Is Anonymous, FORBES, Nov. 29, 1999, at
184-85 http:llwww.forbes.comlforbes/99/1129/6413182sl.htm (noting the existence of a Microsoft
"watermark" and other technology that allows websites to track users).
36. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 9, at 391-92 (discussing the greater tolerance
for secondary use of personal information in the United States versus Europe); Joel R. Reidenberg,
Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the U.S. Private Sector, 80 IOWA L. REV. 497,
530 (1995) [hereinafter Reidenberg, Setting Standards] ("As seen in the direct marketing and em-
ployment contexts, secondary use is a problem in the U.S. private sector, particularly with respect to
marketing applications.").
37. See H. JEFF SMITH, MANAGING PRIVACY: INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND CORPORATE
AMERICA 7-8 (1994) (discussing the concern that privacy is harder to maintain with increasing
computerization).
38. See, e.g., Kang, supra note 31, at 1238-41 (discussing the myriad opportunities for "data
mining" once large databases have been constructed); Josh Mchugh, Mind Readers, FORBES, Nov.
29, 1999, at 18889 http:/wvww.forbes.com/forbes/99/1129/6413182s4.htm (noting the "wealth of
data" Yahoo! Gathers on its customers).
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II. INTERNATIONAL DATA PRIVACY PRINCIPLES
These information processing characteristics present the same problem
for citizens around the globe; namely, how to assure privacy in the complex
world of online transactions. Norms for the treatment of personal informa-
tion exist and share many common attributes across different legal systems
and cultures.39 As illustrated in multilateral instruments40 and academic
scholarship 4 I democracies converge on a basic set of principles for "data
protection" or "data privacy." These norms of fair information practice con-
stitute what can be termed First Principles, and their acceptance separates
democratic societies from totalitarian regimes.42 Yet, important divergences
in the execution of these First Principles can be found at the national level. 4 3
For the Internet, these divergences promote significant conflict.
A. Convergence on First Principles
In democracies around the world, information privacy is recognized as a
critical element of civil society44 and as a necessity for the development of
the Intemet.45 Trust and confidence online will not be possible without data
39. See, eg., WESTIN, supra note 14, at 29-30 (illustrating that concern for privacy protection
is a cross-cultural phenomenon).
40. See, e.g., COE Convention, supra note 14; OECD Guidelines, supra note 14; European
Data Protection Directive, supra note 11.
41. For a scholarly discussion of data privacy in a democracy see generally BENNETT, supra
note 10, at 96-111; CATE, supra note 10; FLAHERTY, supra note 14; WESTIN, supra note 14;
Bennett, supra note 2; Robert Gellman, Conflict and Overlap in Privacy Regulation: National,
International, and Private, in BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE: INTERNATIONAL POLICY AND THE
GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 255 (Brian Kahin & Charles Nesson eds., 1997).
42. Data protection is necessary to protect citizen freedoms and liberties from totalitarian re-
pression. See Charles D. Raab, Privacy, Democracy, iformation, in THE GOVERNANCE OF
CYBERSPACE 161 (Brian D. Loader ed., 1997); Spiros Simitis, Reviewing Privacy in an Information
Society, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 707, 734 (1987) (discussing the West German Federal Constitutional
Court's protection of information collected in the census as a way to protect other constitutional
rights).
43. See, e.g., BENNET, supra note 10, at 193-219 (explaining the differences in data protec-
tion practices between Sweden, West Germany, Britain, and the United States); JOEL R.
REIDENBERG & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, ON-LINE SERVICES AND DATA PROTECTION AND PRIVACY:
REGULATORY RESPONSES (1998).
44. See Michael Donald Kirby, Privacy Protection-A New Beginning?, in PROc. XXI INT'L
CONF. DATA PROT. COMM'RS (1999) <http'//www.pco.org.hk/conproceed.html> [hereinafter
PROC. XXI INT'L CONF.] (arguing that "[w]hat is at stake [with privacy] is nothing less than the
future of the human condition"); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Participation: Personal Informa-
tion and Public Sector Regulation in the United States, 80 IOWA L. REV. 553, 557 (1995) (arguing
that a goal of data protection is to protect deliberative democracy).
45. See A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce, supra note 8, at 13-14 (pledging U.S.
support for personal data privacy protection to ensure continued growth of the Internet).HeinOnline  -- 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1325 1999-2000
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protection.46 The most common definition of information privacy is the right
of the individual to "information self-determination." 47
Over the last thirty years, governments and theorists around the world
have identified a core set of fair information practices to assure citizens' par-
ticipation in the collection and use of their personal information. These
benchmarks form the First Principles of information privacy and revolve
around four sets of standards: (1) data quality; (2) transparency or openness
of processing; (3) treatment of particularly sensitive data, often defined as
data about health, race, religious beliefs, and sexual life among other attrib-
utes; and (4) enforcement mechanisms.48 In examining the emergence of
national data privacy rules, Professor Colin Bennett has shown a high degree
of policy convergence regarding the treatment of personal information. 49
Professor Bennett distills these standards into ten elements that parallel the
1972 recommendation of the Younger Committee in the United Kingdom50
namely that an organization:
* Must be accountable for all personal information in its possession;
* Should identify the purposes for which the information is processed at or
before the time of collection;
• Should only collect personal information with the knowledge and consent
of the individual (except under specified circumstances);
* Should limit the collection of personal information to that which is neces-
sary for pursuing the identified purposes;
46. See European Initiative in Electronic Commerce, supra note 8, at 20 (discussing the need
to create consumer confidence). See generally FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, SELF-REGULATION AND
PRIVACY ONLINE: REPORT TO CONGRESS (1999) <http:/lwvw.ftc.gov/opa1999/9907/reportl999.htm>
[hereinafter SELF-REGULATION]; FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO
CONGRESS (1998) <http:l/www.ftc.gov/reportsLprivacy3/toc.htm> [hereinafter PRIVACY ONLINE]
(discussing the FTC's approach to online privacy).
47. The term "information self-determination" was first used in a famous German census de-
cision. See Census Act of 1983 Partially Unconstitutional, Judgment of the First Senate (Karlssuhe,
Dec. 15, 1983), translated in 5 HUM. Rrs. L.J. 94 (1984); Simitis, supra note 42, at 734-35 (dis-
cussing the ruling in the German census case). The American formulation, according the individual
control over the disclosure of personal information, traces its roots to a study project of the Asso-
ciation of the Bar of the City of New York, later published by Alan Westin. See WESTIN, supra
note 14, at xiii. Attributed to Alan Westin, rather than the Bar project, this formulation defines
information privacy as the right of the individual to control the use of personal information: "Pri-
vacy is the claim of individuals, groups or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and
to what extent information about them is communicated to others." Id. at 7. More recently, Paul
Schwartz has argued that the "control" definition of privacy misses important contextual distinc-
tions in modem society. See Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND.
L. REV. 1609, 1663-65 (1999).
48. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 9, at 12-17 (discussing the development and
substance of the First Principles in Europe); Reidenberg, Setting Standards, supra note 36, at 512-
16.
49. See BENNETr, supra note 10, at 95-115.
50. In May 1970, the British Labour government appointed an interdepartmental committee to
study privacy issues and report back to Parliament. See id. at 85-86. The chair of the committee
was Sir Kenneth Younger. See id. at 85.
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* Should not use or disclose personal information for purposes other than
those identified, except with the consent of the individual (thefinalityprin-
ciple);
* Should retain information only as long as necessary;
* Should ensure that personal information is kept accurate, complete, and up
to date;
* Should protect personal information with appropriate security safeguards;
* Should be open about its policies and practices and maintain no secret in-
formation systems;
• Should allow data subjects access to their personal information, vith an
ability to amend it if necessary.5l
In the context of the Internet, these First Principles remain as important
as ever. As !he Internet increases the capacity and incentive for organiza-
tions to engage in information trafficking, rigorous application of the First
Principles becomes ever more critical. In particular, information flows on
the Internet might readily infringe the norms that require: (1) the specifica-
tion of the purpose for data collection; (2) the consent of individuals in con-
nection with the treatment of their personal information; (3) the transparency
of data practices for individuals, including awareness of data collection and
access to stored personal information; (4) special protection for sensitive
data; and (5) the establishment of enforcement remedies and mechanisms.
Nevertheless, the wide degree of international consensus on the First
Principles is reflected in major policy instruments and national laws that,
over the years, endorsed the norms.52 The United States, for example, has
through law adopted various data privacy standards and relied on self-
restraint to fill the gaps in protection.53 Although the resulting standards
hardly address the full set of First Principles (in particular with respect to
transparency of processing and secondary use of personal information)54 the
51. Colin J. Bennett & Rebecca Grant, Introduction, in VISIONS OF PRIVACY: POLICY
CHOICES FOR THE DIGITAL AGE 6 (Colin J. Bennett & Rebecca Grant eds., 1999) [hereinafter
VISIONS OF PRIVACY].
52. See generally THE PRIVACY LAW SOURCEBOOK: UNITED STATES LAW, INTERNATIONAL
LAW, AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS (Marc Rotenberg ed., 1999) (consolidating the texts of various
national laws and international instruments on data privacy).
53. See Privacy Act of 1974,5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994) (regulating government data processing);
Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994) (regulating credit reporting); Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2501 (1994) (providing for privacy of electronic
communications); Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1994) (regulating pri-
vacy for video rental customers); Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 551
(1994) (protecting privacy of cable subscribers). See generally Robert M. Gellman, Fragmented
Incomplete, and Discontinuous: 7he Failure of Federal Privacy Regulatory Proposals and Institu-
tions, 6 SOFTWARE L.L 199 (1993) (discussing the attempts and failures to enact statutory protec-
tions incorporating the full set of First Principles).
54. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 9, at 379-405 (showing that law and practice
in the United States fail to respond to the complete set of norms, but do include narrow protections
that cover some of the elements of the First Principles).
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United States has made a public commitment to the broader set of First Prin-
ciples. Beginning in 1973, the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare elaborated one of the first full codes of fair information practice.55
The code embodied norms for transparency of data processing, access td
stored personal information, restrictions on secondary use of personal infor-
mation, correction of erroneous information, accuracy, and security safe-
guards.56 Fifteen years later, the Clinton Administration recognized that the
complete set of First Principles were still the basis for privacy protections.
But despite the failure of non-regulatory policies to succeed in protecting
information privacy, the Administration still sought industry development of
voluntary codes.57
During the 1970s and 1980s, national laws in Europe emerged that con-
tained comprehensive standards embodying the First Principles.8 By the
early 1980s, international instruments ratified this basic common set of prin-
ciples for data protection. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), comprised of the major industrialized nations of the
world, adopted voluntary guidelines for fair treatment of personal informa-
tion5 9 Justice Michael Kirby of Australia, the chairman of the OECD group
drafting the voluntary guidelines observed: "Surprisingly, in all of the major
international efforts that have so far addressed. .. [data protection], there has
been a broad measure of agreement on the 'basic rules' around which do-
mestic privacy legislation should cluster."60 Contemporaneously, the Coun-
cil of Europe, a post-World War II intergovernmental organization dedicated
to the protection of human rights, opened for signature an international treaty
adopting essentially the same norms for data privacy, but the treaty created
binding rules for sigatories.61 These instruments provided a model for later
international laws such as the New Zealand data protection act.62 By 1990,
55. See H.E.W. GUIDELINES, supra note 14.
56. See id.
57. See generally U.S. DEP'TOF COMMERCE, PRIVACY AND ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (1998)
<http://www.doc.gov/ecommercelprivacy.htm> (showing that the OECD Guidelines containing the
complete set of First Principles is the guidepost for privacy protection and calling on industry to
develop private sector codes of conduct); PRIVACY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 30 (rephrasing First Principles in the context of the Clinton Admini-
stration's Internet policy). For a highly critical view of U.S. policy, see generally Joel IL Reiden-
berg, Restoring Americans'Privacy in Electronic Commerce, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 771 (1999).
58. For a description of statutory developments in the area of data privacy, see generally
FLAHERTY, supra note 14; BENNET , supra note 10, at 95-115.
59. See OECD Guidelines, supra note 14.
60. Michael D. Kirby, Transborder Data Flows and the "Basic Rules" of Data Privacy, 16
STAN. J. INT'L L. 27, 29 (1980).
61. See COE Convention, supra note 14. The convention, however, requires safeguards for
sensitive data unlike the OECD guidelines which are silent on the issue. See id.
62. See, e.g., Blair Stewart, Adequacy of Data Protection Measures: The New Zealand Case,
Paper presented at the 12d' Privacy Laws & Business International Conference, Cambridge, U.K.,
June 29, 1999 <http:lwww.privacy.org.nzlmedialadequacy.html> (noting that New Zealand's law
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even the United Nations had adopted a resolution affirming the First Princi-
ples as a global imperative.63
More recently, in 1995, the European Union concluded a regulatory pro-
cess that culminated in the adoption of the European Directive on Data Pro-
tection.64 The Directive requires that the Member States of the European
Union enact national legislation conforming to a defined set of substantive
standards.6 5 Europe's goal is to harmonize fair information practices at a
high level of protection. This set of standards is a comprehensive endorse-
ment of First Principles, and has become the model for legislation in many
non-European countries.66
As a further demonstration of this consensus on First Principles, today in
Eastern Europe and in South America, data protection has become a critical
part of the national movements to establish open, democratic societies.67
Indeed, the international community has affirmed the applicability of First
Principles to Internet activities.68
was modeled on the OECD Guidelines); HUNGARIAN REPUBLIC, THE FIRST THREE YEARS OF THE
PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSIONER FOR DATA PROTECTION AND FREEDOM OF INFORMATION 66
(1998) [hereinafter HUNGARIAN REPORT] (reporting that the Council ofEurope Convention was the
model for Hungarian data protection).
63. See Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerized Personal Data Files, U.N. GA Res.
45195 (1990) <http:llwww.unhchr.chlhtrltmenu31b/lI.htm> (adopting "Guidelines for the Regula-
tion of Computerized Personal Data Files').
64. See European Data Protection Directive, supra note 1I. For a discussion of the adoption
process, see Spiros Simitis, From the Market to the Polls: 7he EU Directive on the Protection of
Personal Data, 80 IOWA L. REV 445 (1995).
65. For a discussion of the European law-making process see GEORGE A. BERMANN, ROGER
3. GOEBEL, WILLIAM 3. DAVEY & ELEANOR M. Fox, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY LAW (1993 & Supp. 1995).
66. Many Eastern European countries, including Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia,
along with Latin American countries such as Chile and Argentina, have adopted or are in the proc-
ess of adopting European-style laws. See CATE, supra note 10, at 45-47 (1997) (discussing the
European consensus on privacy principles); HUNGARIAN REPORT, supra note 62, at 68 & n.19 (in-
dicating the use of the European Data Protection Directive to promote development of Hungarian
law).
67. See HUNGARIAN REPORT, supra note 62, at 11; Pablo A. Palazzi, Proteccion de Dates,
Privacidady Habeas Data en America <http://members.theglobe.com/pablop/LatinoAmerica.htnl
?nfhp=948126670&rld=446232546> (compiling data protection laws and jurisprudence in Latin
America). Even in Asia, global trade and services along with the recognition and expectation of the
affluent countries for the respect of human rights has led to interest in the First Principles. See
Stephen Lau, The Asian Status with Respect to the Observance of the OECD Guidelines and the EU
Directive, in PROC. XIX INT'L CONF. DATA PROT. COMM'RS (1997) <http:llwww.privacy.
fgov.belconference/authors.html> [hereinafter PROC. XIXTH INT'L CONF.].
68. See, e.g., Ministerial Declaration on the Protection of Privacy on Global Networks,
OECD Doe. DSTI/ICCP/REG(98)10, FINAL (Dec. 18, 1998) <http://applil.oecd.org/olis/
1998doc.nsfL4cf568b5b90dad99412567lbO(4bed59/61cc8ca3lf9457c12566de0506c 3S$FILE
12E81013.ENG> [hereinafter Ministerial Declaration] (reaffirming the 1980 OECD Guidelines for
global networks); Working Party Established under Art. 29 of Directive 95/46/EC, Working Docu-
ment: Processing of Personal Data on the Internet, E.C. Doe. DG XV 5013199 WP 16 (Feb. 23,
1999) <http:lleuropa.eu.intlconmlintemalmarketlenlmedialdataprotAvpdocslwpl6en.htm> [here-
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B. Divergence on Execution
Even though democracies have converged on First Principles and have
reaffirmed their applicability to the Internet, studies of national legislation
and data protection policies in numerous countries reflect varying degrees of
adherence to these basic principles.69 In effect, the execution of First Princi-
ples diverges significantly across countries. At the outset, national policies
can implement First Principles in multiple ways; some effective, others not.
More subtly, national policies may interpret First Principles quite differently.
These divergences in execution present a fundamental challenge to Internet
information flows and the structure of information-processing activities on
the global network. The danger is that seemingly small differences can have
significant effects as obstacles to online services or as incentives for the dis-
tortion of services.70
1. Implementation.
There are three approaches to the implementation of First Principles.
The predominant approach, found outside the United States, is a comprehen-
sive data protection law. Under this model, omnibus legislation strives to
create a complete set of rights and responsibilities for the processing of per-
sonal information, whether by the public or private sector.71 First Principles
become statutory rights and these statutes create data protection supervisory
agencies to assure oversight and enforcement of those rights.72 Within this
framework, additional precision and flexibility may also be achieved through
codes of conduct and other devices.3 Overall, this implementation approach
treats data privacy as a political right anchored among the panoply of funda-
inafter Processing of Personal Data]; Recommendation No. R(99)5 of the Comm. of Ministers,
Guidelines for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Collection and Processing of Per-
sonal Data on Information Highways (Feb. 23, 1999) <http-.//www.coe.fr/DataProtectionl
elignes.htm>.
69. See, e.g., Sophie Louveaux, Comment concilier le commerce electronique et la protection
de la vie privde?, in Etienne Montero ed., DROIT DES TECHNOLOGIES DE L'INFORMATION:
REGARDS PROSPECTIFS (Etienne Montero ed. 1999); REIDENBERG & SCHWARTZ, supra note 43;
SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERO, supra note 9; ADRIANA C.M. NUGTER, TRANSBORDER FLOW OF
PERSONAL DATA WITHIN THE EC (1990).
70. See REIDENBERG & SCHWARTZ, supra note 43, at 142-49.
71. See CATE, supra note 10, at 32-48 (describing the content of data privacy laws of Euro-
pean countries and multinational organizations).
72. See BENNETT, supra note 10, at 153-92 (explaining how the First Principles were imple-
mented in Sweden, West Germany, Britain, and the United States).
73. See Stefano Rodota, Internet: Electronic mail, electronic sales, ethical codes, in PROC.
XX INT'L CONF. DATA PROT. COMM'RS (1998).
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mental human rights and the rights are attributed to "data subjects" or citi-
zens.74
In the second approach to implementation, found in the United States,
the role of the state is far more limited. Legal rules are relegated to narrowly
targeted sectoral protections. For example, the Video Privacy Protection Act
prohibits the disclosure of titles of particular films rented by a customer at a
video store,75 while viewing habits on the Internet of streaming video remain
unprotected. Under this sectoral approach, the primary source for the terms
and conditions of information privacy is self-regulation. Instead of relying
on governmental regulation, this approach seeks to protect privacy through
practices developed by industry norms, codes of conduct, and contracts
rather than statutory legal rights. Data privacy becomes a market issue rather
than a basic political question, and the rhetoric casts the debate in terms of
"consumers" and users rather than "citizens."76
The third approach to implementation of First Principles is technical.
Under this "code" or "lex informatica" model,77 engineering specifications
embody policy rules for data protection. This is particularly noteworthy for
privacy rules in the online environment. Technical rules and default settings
establish data privacy norms.78 This approach is, thus, a hybrid: The model
contains formal rules but is neither state regulation nor industry self-
regulation. Unlike state-centric policymaking in the case of comprehensive
statutes and industry-centric policymaking in the case of self-regulation and
74. See generally notes 184-215 infra and accompanying text; CATE, supra note 10, at 42-43
(discussing the importance of privacy in the European Directive; Simitis, supra note 64 (discussing
the E.U. Member States' emphasis on protecting personal privacy rights).
75. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2710-11 (1994).
76. See Pamela Samuelson, A New Kind of Privacy? Regulating Uses of Personal Data in the
Global Izfonnation Economy, 87 CAL. L. REV. 751, 770-73 (1999) (commenting that the market-
based treatment of personal data privacy might change).
77. Larry Lessig refers to technical "code" as law. See LARRY LE[SIG, CODE AND OTHER
LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 6 (1999).
78. See id.; see also Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 EMoRY
L.L 869, 898 (1996) [hereinafter Lessig, Constitution in Cyberspace] (discussing the use of com-
puter code as a regulatory tool or constraint on the use of a document or program); Joel R. Reiden-
berg, Governing Networks and Rule-Making in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.L 911, 929 (1996)
[hereinafter Reidenberg, Governing Networks] ('State governments can and should be involved in
the establishment of norms for network activities, yet state governments cannot and should not
attempt to expropriate all regulatory power from network communities"); Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex
informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules through Technology, 76 TEx. L. REv.
553, 555 (1998) [hereinafter Reidenberg, Lex Informatica] (noting that "the set of rules for infor-
mation flows imposed by technology and communication networks form a 'Lex Informatica' that
policymakers must understand, consciously recognize, and encourage"); Joel R. Reidenberg, Rules
of the Road for Global Electronic Highways: Merging the Trade and Technical Paradigms, 6
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287, 296-301 (1993) (commenting on the use of technical solutions to resolve
various information integrity and interoperability issues).
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narrowly targeted sectoral rules, technical rules have historically developed
in technical fora outside the realm of public policy discourse.79
2. Interpretation.
Beyond the divergence in implementation of the First Principles, there is
also important variation in the contextual interpretation of the Principles.80
The meaning ascribed to each of the First Principles is not harmonized at the
international level. These divergent interpretations can have great signifi-
cance for the structure and development of online services on the Internet.
The complexity and fluidity of information processing in a global network
enable participants to engage in regulatory arbitrage. 8' This means that an
Internet participant might shift the location of a server or database to take
advantage of more permissive interpretations. At the same time, this diver-
gence provides challenges and opportunities for the effective protection of
personal data.
At the outset, the interpretation of the very applicability of First Princi-
ples is hardly uniform, especially for clickstream data. In particular, the ap-
plicability of First Principles depends on the classification of data as
"personal information." Since information traces on the Internet are ram-
pant, the distinction between anonymous and "personal information" is, thus,
particularly critical.82 For some Internet participants' traces may never be
linked to the individual Web user and the user has effective anonymity. A
Web site's log files may, for instance, only identify the visitor's information
service provider and not the specific visitor. However, the more broadly
"personal information" is interpreted for data protection purposes, the harder
anonymity is to achieve. The same Web log files could identify a visitor if
the information service provider reveals the identity of its subscriber. Thus,
if the interpretation is broad, data protection law will apply more widely to
Internet activities and more frequently to Internet participants.
Some countries treat information about legal entities as "personal infor-
mation."83 Most limit the scope to "information relating to an identified or
79. See Reidenberg, LexInformatica, supra note 78, at 554.
80. See BENNMtT, supra note 10, at 111-15, 222-23; CATE, supra note 10, at 97-100;
FLAHERTY, supra note 14, at 371-407.
81. See A. Michael Froomkin, The Internet as a Source of Regulatory Arbitrage, in BORDERS
IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 41, at 129, 151-52 (noting that it would be very difficult to eliminate
"data havens").
82. See Kang, supra note 31, at 1208-10, 1220-33 (drawing distinctions between personal and
nonpersonal information and illustrating the breadth of data traces left by Internet users).
83. Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, and Switzerland are among the countries that apply
privacy protections to information about corporate entities. See OECD, Inventory of Instruments
and Mechanisms Contributing to the Implementation and Enforcement of the OECD Privacy
Guidelines on Global Networks, OECD Doe. DSTI/ICCP/Reg (98)12/FINAL 143, 154, 179,
198, 226 <http:llwww.olis.oecd.orglolisl1998doe.nsflinkto/dsti-iccp-reg(98)12-final>.
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identifiable natural person."84 The meaning of "identifiable person," how-
ever, is variable. France and Belgium, for example, under pre-European
Data Protection Directive law that remains in effect, treat data as personal
information if there is any way to link the information to a natural person.85
The United Kingdom, however, took a more restrained view and examined
whether the data user could actually link the information to a specific per-
son.86 These particular interpretive subtleties are unlikely to change with the
transposition of the European Directive into member state national law.
Further, some countries also explicitly exclude differing types of information
from the scope of coverage whether or not the data relates to an individual.
Belgium's statute, for example, excludes any informtion published by the
individual concerned8 7 In the United States, interpretations of the Fourth
Amendment to the Constitution emphasize a "reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy" against government searches in the context of law enforcement, which
translates into a general policy preference of excluding publicly available
information from protection.S8 Statutory protections in the United States
tend to address applicability in terms of activities rather than individuals.
For example, the Fair Credit Reporting Act defines covered information in
terms of "consumer reports" rather than identifiable individuals.89 The Cable
Communications Policy Act and the Video Privacy Protection Act each refer
to "personally identifiable information," but never define the term.90
84. European Data Protection Directive, supra note 11, at art. 2(a).
85. See Commission do la protection de la vie priv6e, Recommandation No. 01196 du 23 sep-
tembre 1996, Recommandation de la Commission de ]a protection de ]a vie priv~e i propos de
l'analyse do la consommation de m~dicaments en Belgique base sur des informations issues des
prescriptions mrdicales, at 5 (noting that data cannot be considered anonymous if the person re-
sponsible for the treatment can reidentify the person concerned without an important special effort);
Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertis, D6liberation No. 97-051 do 39 juin 1997
<http:www.cnil.fr/thematic/docs/ral 8 la.pdt> (treating Web server log files a  personal information
even though the server did not have access to the actual identity of visitors); COMMISSION
NATIONALS DE L'INFORMATIQUE ST DES LIBERT.S, Dix ANS D'INFORMATIQUE ET LIBERTES 42
(1988) (noting that the Commission gives a broad interpretation to the term 'nominative informa-
tion' in the French law).
86. See U.K. DATA PROTECTION REGISTRAR, DATA PROTECTION AND THE INTERNET:
GUIDANCE ON REGISTRATION (1997) <http://www.open.gov.uktdpr/intemet.htm> (discussing
"identifiable information" under the old Data Protection Act); Data Protection Act, 1998, ch. 29, §
I(1) (Eng.) <http://www.hmso.gov.ukfactsfactsl99880029-a.htm#l> (adopting definitional terms
in accordance with the earlier Guidance),.
87. Loi du 8 decembre 1992, art. 3, § 2.
88. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435,437 (1976) (holding that individual lacked
Fourth Amendment interest in bank records). Congress responded to the Supreme Court's decision
in Miller with the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (1994).
89. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1) (1994).
90. The Cable Communications Policy Act indicates only that "aggregate" data which "does
iot identify particular persons" is excluded from the definition. See 47 U.S.C. § 551(a)(2)(A)
1994). The Video Privacy Protection Act, however, merely states that the term includes informa-
on that identifies a person as having requested specific video materials. See 18 U.S.C. §
710(a)(3) (1994).
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The interpretation of the transparency element of the First Principles also
varies significantly across countries. Transparency requires that the proc-
essing of personal information be open and understandable. Yet, the precise
meaning of this element is inconsistent in different places. Belgium, for ex-
ample, required that individuals be informed of the details of the use of per-
sonal information prior to collection. In particular, the purpose for
collection, also termed the finality of data use, must be disclosed with speci-
ficity.91 The Belgian courts have interpreted this requirement strictly, ruling,
for example, that a general statement disclosing that personal information
will be used to provide financial services and better service to the client is
insufficient to cover the use of the information in insurance solicitations.92
The notice must be provided prior to collection of personal information if the
collection is directly from the person concerned; otherwise the notice must
be provided contemporaneously with the storage of the personal informa-
tion. 93 France only required notification from those collecting information
directly from individuals. Further, the French notification must contain a
specific set of details, including whether the information must be given and
what consequences follow in the absence of a response.94 In contrast, U.S.
law does not generally impose an obligation to inform individuals that data
about them is being collected. However, a number of targeted statutes do
require that individuals be informed prior to the dissemination of certain per-
sonal information to third parties, namely video rental records,95 credit re-
ports for nonstatutorily permitted purposes,96 telephone records,97 and cable
subscription records.9B
Oversight of information privacy is also handled in many different ways.
Data protection supervisory agencies are a common feature in democracies,99
but agency powers are often specific to each country. Some countries, for
example, established regulatory enforcement agencies and licensing boards,
while others adopted an ombudsman position.100 Within the European Un-
ion, the European Data Protection Directive mandates that each Member
State create an independent supervisory agency to monitor the application of
91. See Trib. Comm. Anvers, 7juillet 1994, reprinted in 4 Droit de l'informatique et des t&l -
comms 52-53 (1994).
92. See id.
93. Loi du 8 decembre 1992, art. 4(l), 9.
94. Loi No. 78-17 du 6janvier 1978, art. 27 <http:lww.cnil.fr/textestext02.htm>.
95. See 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b) (1994).
96. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(2) (1994).
97. See 47 U.S.C. § 222(c), 222(e) (1997).
98. See 47 U.S.C. §551(c) (1994).
99. For discussions of different supervising models see BENNETt, supra note 10, at 158-92;
FLAHERTY, supra note 14, at 11-16.
100. See, e.g., Mayer-Schonberger, supra note 2, at 228.
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data protection laws and to investigate violations.OI In contrast, the United
States has repeatedly rejected an agency enforcement model for privacy
oversight, favoring industry self-regulation.102
In order for the national supervisory agency to monitor compliance with
data protection requirements and to assure that the processing of personal
information is not done secretively, European countries require public notifi-
cation of data processing activities to the national supervisory agencies.03
Nevertheless, the content of the notifications among European countries has
not been uniform. Although the European Data Protection Directive stipu-
lates the minimum information that must be filed,104 existing European na-
tional laws have small but significant variations that are likely to persist.05
France requires that the origin of personal information be included on the
public notification, while Belgium does not, and the United Kingdom re-
quires a textual description in connection with declarations of Internet ac-
tivities involving personal information.I06 In the United States, there is no
obligation to disclose the existence of data processing activities to a govern-
ment agency; any such obligation would run counter to the U.S. constitu-
tional tradition, which is suspicious of such government intrusions.107 Only
the Fair Credit Reporting Act contains a general obligation to notify the pub-
lic through newspaper advertisements of the treatment of personal informa-
tion, and its requirement concerns only one specific use of credit report
information-the sale of names for junk mail solicitations.108
The substantial differences in interpretation demonstrate that First Prin-
ciples have significant idiosyncratic national features. Along with the vary-
ing implementations of First Principles, these divergences take on a critical
101. See European Data Protection Directive, supra note I I, at art. 28.
102. See Gellman, supra note 53.
103. See European Data Protection Directive, supra note 11, at art. 18.
104. See id. atart. 19.
105. See REIDENBERG & SCHWARTZ, supra note 43, at 127-31 (discussing important diver-
gences on which the European Data Protection Directive is silent). The transposition of the Euro-
pean Data Protection Directive will allow the Member States an important "marge de manoeuvre"
to interpret the standards in the Directive. Indeed, Professor Rigaux notes that the Directive has
many conditional provisions that are drafted to "leave without doubt to the national and European
supervisory authorities the interpretation of the text along with the courts and tribunals, and in the
last instance the [European] Court offustice." Francois Rigaux, La vie privie, une libertdparmi les
autres, in XDXTH INT'L CONK, supra note 67, at 2 (translated by author).
106. Compare Loi No. 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978, art. 19 (France), with Loi du 8 decembre
1992, art. 3 (Belgium) <http:llwww.privacy.fgov.be/Ioivie_priv6e belge.htm>, with U.K. DATA
PROTECTION REOISTRAR, supra note 86.
107. See CATH, supra note 10, at 124 (noting that such a "scheme is anathema to the U.S.
constitutional system"); INFORMATION POLICY COMMITTEE, NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRA-
STRUCTURE TASK FORCE, OPTIONS FOR PROMOTING PRIVACY ON THE NATIONAL INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE (Apr. 1997) <http.lwww.iitf.nisgovipclprivacy.htm> (highlighting that the
U.S. prefers non-regulatory solutions)
108. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(e)(5) (1994).
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dimension for the Internet where competition among information privacy
rules ensures confrontation and conflict.
III. ONLINE CONFRONTATION AND CONFLICTS
The lack of harmonization in the execution of First Principles poses a
fundamental challenge to international data flows and the Internet. The
Internet places divergent rules in proximity through architectural features
that promote geographic indeterminacy. If the policies achieved by diver-
gent executions of First Principles were "functionally similar,"'0 9 then inter-
national data flows would not face challenges. But, since the degree of
substantive protection varies widely, 10 international data flows assure con-
frontation and conflict among the different national regimes for protection of
personal information.
In effect, the characteristics of data transfers destabilize"' the fair treat-
ment of personal information. Multinational processing of clickstream in-
formation, warehoused data, and the pressures for secondary use, in
particular, place the legal rules, data protection policies, and information
practices of various jurisdictions in direct conflict.12 If access to, collection,
and processing of personal information occur in several countries over the
network, then each of the implicated countries may assert legal jurisdic-
tion.113 At the same time, multiple regulatory regimes attenuate the en-
forcement jurisdiction of each country." 4 This paradox is not readily
109. This term refers to the search by comparative law scholars to find similarity in the sub-
stantive results across different countries rather than identity of legal instruments in different legal
cultures. See Preparation of a methodology for evaluating the adequacy of the level ofprotection of
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data, Annex to the Annual Report 1998 of the
Working Party Established by Art. 29 of Directive 95/46/EC, Eur. Comm. Doc. No. XV D/5047/98
(1998) <http://www.droit.fimdp.ac.be/crid/privacy/Tbdf/Chapitrel.pdf>; SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG,
supra note 9, at 24-25 (describing use of "functional similarity" analysis to compare U.S. and
European data protection practices).
110. See generally CATE, supra note 10; SWIRE & LITAN, supra note 10; Mayer-Schonberger
supra note 2; Existing Case-Law on Compliance with Data Protection Laws and Principles in the
Member States of the European Union, Annex to the Annual Report 1998 of the Working Party
Established under Article 29 of Directive 95/46/EC, E.C. Doc. XV D/5047198 (Douwe Korff ed.,
1998) [hereinafter Existing Case-Law].
111. See notes 16-34 supra and accompanying text.
112. Robert Gellman writes that the uncertainty of legal rules for interactions on the Internet
results in conflicting and overlapping privacy laws and rules. See Gellman, supra note 41, at 272-
77.
113. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr. Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: The Role of Intermediaries, in
BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 41, at 164 (examining the jurisdictional problems that the
Internet presents); Jon Bing, Data Protection: Jurisdiction and the Choice of Law, in PROC. XXI
INT'L CONF, supra note 44 (analyzing jurisdictional and choice of law problems for data protection
law).
114. See Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1216-21 (1999)
(arguing that the threat of liability for individual users is far less than what many commentators
have suggested because of the difficulty of establishing jurisdiction over the users).
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resolved by traditional "conflict of law" principles.,1s The overlapping and
malleable nature of international data flows present a basic challenge to the
localization required for choice of law analysis."16 Multiple laws may apply
to an unique activity. In terms of substantive conflicts, a number of key
problems arise.
A. Implementation and Systemic Legal Conflict
The most well-known conflicts arise from systemic differences in the
approach and the specific content of data protection rights."7 In Europe,
comprehensive data protection laws establish rights and obligations for the
treatment of personal information."S Elsewhere, information privacy may be
assured by narrower legal rules, policies or practices, or alternatively, data
protection may even be ignored.119 In the absence of comprehensive data
protection legislation, the full range of internationally-recognized principles
for fair information practice may be hard to satisfy; narrow, sectoral laws,
policies, ad hoc protections and practices typically ignore key elements of
the First Principles.
If data protection is taken seriously, then systemic legal conflicts should
cause disruption of international data flows.120 Both the European Union's
Data Protection Directive and existing European Member State laws provide
for the prohibition on data flows to countries without satisfactory privacy
protection.12 1 For the United States alone, Europe has justification to restrict
the processing of European personal information; U.S. legal rights are too
narrow and too rare, while the U.S. reliance on self-regulation has proven
115. See id. at 1210 (discussing the dichotomy between default and mandatory rules along
with the problem of spillover effects).
116. See Bing, supra note 113.
117. See Working Party Established under Art. 29 of Directive 951461EC, Discussion Docu-
ment. First Orientations on Transfers of Personal Data to Third Countries - Possible Ways For-
ward in Assessing Adequacy, E.C. Doc. XV D15020197-WP 4 (June 26, 1997) <http://europa.eu.
int/comm/intemalmarketen/media/dataprot/wpdocshvp4en.htrn> [hereinafter Working Party, First
Orientations]; Working Party Established under Art. 29 of Directive 95146/EC, Working Document:
Transfers of Personal Data to Third Countries: Applying Articles 25 and 26 of the EU Data Pro-
tection Directive, E.C. Doc. DG XV D15025198WP 12 (July 24, 1998) <http.//europa.eu.int/comni/
internal market/en/medialdataprotwpdocslwpl2en.htm> [hereinafter Working Party, Transfers of
Personal Data].
118. See European Data Protection Directive, supra note 11.
119. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 9, at 24-25 (discussing U.S. data privacy re-
gime).
120. See, e.g., Ulf Brflhann, Data Protection in Europe: Looking Ahead, in PROC. XIXTH
INT'L CONF., supra note 67, at 3-4 ("Nobody should underestimate the problem by doubting the
political will of the European Union to protect the fundamental human rights of citizens.").
121. See European Data Protection Directive, supra note 11, at art. 25; France, Law No. 78-
17 of Jan. 25, 1978, at art. 24; see also Peter Blume, An EEC Policy for Data Protection, I1
COMPUTERIL.J 399 (1992); Michael Kirby, Legal Aspects of Transborder Data Flows, 11
COMPUTER/L.L 233 (1992); Schwartz, supra note 12;
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ineffective in protecting privacy at the level of European standards.12 2 Simi-
lar justifications exist for other countries lacking analogous laws and basic
data protection rights. Thus, systemic differences in the approach and rules
of national data protection regimes place each other in direct conflict.
B. Interpretation and Detail Conflict
In addition to systemic conflicts, online services face another important
risk to international data flows. Seemingly minor divergences in the laws of
several countries have significant ramifications for international data flows
of personal information.123 For example, slight differences in the require-
ments for the contents of notification to individuals prior to the collection of
their personal information mean that data collectors cannot use the same no-
tice for residents of different jurisdictions.124 Since the network environment
obscures the location of users, data collectors often face a difficult choice:
Either they ignore the requirements of countries where data collection might
be taking place or they unwittingly contravene these requirements. These
conflicts of divergence become particularly pronounced for intracorporate
data-sharing arrangements and for emerging electronic commerce activi-
ties.l25
C. Compliance and Conflict
Beyond conflicts created by systemic differences and interpretive diver-
gences, compliance deficiencies within a national framework may lead to
claims of discrimination. For example, many European websites surrepti-
tiously capture information about their visitors in violation of local data pro-
tection laws; 126 in the United States, an FTC study of online services reported
122. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 9 (demonstrating the significant weaknesses
in U.S. privacy law and practice as compared to European principles); Reidenberg, supra note 57
(arguing that U.S. privacy protection has poor results); U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCF, DRAFT
INTERNATIONAL SAFE HARBOR PRIVACY PRINCIPLES (Nov. 15, 1999) <http:llvW.ita.doc.gov/
ecom/Principlesi 199.htin> (proposing a privacy accord between the United States and the Euro-
pean Union that implicitly recognizes the inadequacy of U.S. law). But see SWIRE & LiTAN, supra
note 10 (arguing that U.S. data privacy law is sufficient).
123. See REIDENBERG & SCHWARTZ, supra note 43, at 139-49 (discussing the impact of con-
flicts on online services and the role of the uniform choice of law rule in the European Directive).
124. If notice requirements do not conflict, then it would be possible, though cumbersome, to
aggregate all notice elements of all relevant laws into one detailed notice.
125. See, e.g., Processing of Personal Data, supra note 68; SWIPE & LITAN, supra note 10, at
60-64.
126. Among the notable examples: In Belgium as of August 5, 1997, none of the major on-
line service providers (MSN, Skynet, CompuServe, Datapak and Interpac) had complied with the
registration requirements of Belgian law. See REIDENBERG & SCHWARTZ, supra note 43, at 195.
In Germany, also in 1997, the websites ofDer Speigel and Kaufhof (a major department store) each
failed to disclose their information practices in violation of German law, see id. at 77, and in
France, La Redoute (a major online retailer) uses "cookies" and fails to disclose its practices in
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dismal adherence to even minimal standards of fair information practice in
1998.127 In Spain, the small number of transfer requests made to the data
protection authority must be disproportionately small when compared to the
reality of data exports.128 This gap between data protection principles and
actual practice transforms the terms of international debate on the protection
of personal information. In the international context, instead of focusing on
the quality of protection afforded to personal information, the debate be-
comes one of unfair discrimination.129 If compliance is a problem in a coun-
try, then to hold foreign data processors to a higher level of actual practice is
discriminatory. The wider the national gap between principle and practice,
the stronger the claim of discrimination if the principles are only applied
stringently to international data flows.
IV. GOVERNANCE CHOICES AND INFORMATION PRIVACY LAWS
Over the years, the conflicts have led to several major international ef-
forts at harmonization of information privacy standards. Indeed, the Organi-
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Guidelines and
the Council of Europe Convention were pre-Internet responses to the grow-
ing disparity in treatment of personal information around the world. As Pro-
fessor Charles Raab has astutely observed, however, "implementation
differences coupled with national differences in administrative use of per-
sonal data and in the configuration of commercial competitive positions in
international trade have made harmonization difficult to achieve even when
confined only to the European Union."130 Just within the context of Europe's
online environment, the European Data Protection Directive is unlikely to
violation of French law. See La Redoute <http://www.laredoute.fr'>. Despite the obviousness of
these violations, none of the companies have been prosecuted for violations of the national laws.
127. See PRIVACY ONLINE, supra note 46; see also SELF-REGULATION, supra note 46 (re-
porting that fewer than 14% of websites' privacy notices comply with the FTC's set of standards for
notice and choice). One year later, a study conducted at Georgetown University found that 65.9%
of the commerical websites sampled in the study posted some form of privacy disclosure. See Mary
. Culnan, Georgetown Internet Privacy Policy Survey: Report to the Federal Trade Commission, at
10 (June 1999) <http:llwww.msb.edulfaculty/culnanni/GIPPS/mrrptPDF>. But only 13.6% of
these sites had a complete policy. See id. at 10.
128. During 1997, only 793 international transfers were declared to the Spanish data protec-
tion agency. See Agencia de Proteccion de Datos, International Data Transfers, at 4 (May 1997)
<http://www.privacyexchange.orgltbdiltbdistudieslspaindt97.html>.
129. See, e.g., Joel R. Reidenberg, The Globalization of Privacy Solutions: The Movement to-
wards Obligatory Standards for Fair Information Practices, in VISIONS OF PRIVACY, supra note
51, at 219-20 ("Any European restrictions on the flow of personal information must, thus, satisfy
the tests of non-discrimination among third countries.'); Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social
Protection: The Impact ofEU and International Rules in Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy Standards,
25 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 50 (2000).
130. See Raab, supra note 42, at 168.
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achieve the goal of full harmonization.131  These efforts, nevertheless,
strengthen the policy convergence on First Principles.
The consensus on First Principles of fair information practice and the
search for harmonized rules obscure the intrinsic connection between gov-
ernance and fair information practices. Professor Colin Bennett, in his pio-
neering work, attributes the degree of convergence on First Principles and
recent harmonization efforts to several forces: (1) common features of in-
formation technology; (2) an elite network of policy activists; and (3) Euro-
pean restrictions on transborder data flows.132 Bennett explains well the
political influences on the policy-making process and the universality of First
Principles. But, he limits his analysis to the "policy toolkit"f33--the choice
of instruments to achieve First Principles-and finds political explanations
for the choice of different policy instruments.
This Part argues, instead, that the national differences are more profound
than the politics leading to the choice of policy instruments. Rather, the di-
vergence in execution derives from fundamentally distinct visions of demo-
cratic governance. Democratic countries do not share the same traditions
and views on the role of the state in protecting the rights of citizens and the
ability of the market to assure the fair treatment of citizens. In these societal
balances, information privacy rules have an essential and normative govern-
ance function.134 Indeed, the distinct executions of First Principles show that
particular information privacy rules either help to shape a liberal, self-reliant
governance balance or help to establish a socially-protective governance bal-
ance.
A. The Normative Role ofPrivacy in Democratic Governance
Privacy is an essential feature of a citizen's ability to participate fully in
democratic society.135 Lfsl6 Majtrnyi, the Hungarian Parliamentary Com-
131. See European Data Protection Directive, supra note 11, at Recitals 7-8 (defining goal of
harmonization); REIDENBERG & SCHWARTZ, supra note 43, at 123-46 (arguing that important di-
vergences in European national laws will persist after the transposition of the European Directive).
132. See BENNETr, supra note 10, at 220-50; see also Bennett, supra note 2.
133. See BENNE, supra note 10, at 194.
134. Bennett argues that "each national choice reflects something about the political system in
question." BENNETT, supra note 10, at 192. This section, however, seeks to show that the connec-
tion between the execution of First Principles and national politics is normative rather than deriva-
tive.
135. See Raab, supra note 42, at 161-65 (noting that data privacy is a necessary protection in
a democratic state); Jeb Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737 (1989) (arguing
that privacy is a basic right of citizens); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Participation: Personal
Information and Public Sector Regulation in the United States, 80 IOWA L. REV. 553, 555 (1995)
(arguing that data privacy is necessary for public participation in government); Simitis, supra note
42, at 732-37 (arguing that privacy is essential for citizens to exercise freedom in a democratic
society).
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missioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information, observed as his
country moved from Eastern European communism to Western European
democracy that "nearly every case we handle has to do, in one way or an-
other, with constructing the constitutional state."3 6 As such, privacy rights
play a normative role in democratic governance. These rights delineate the
boundary of state control over individuals and define the basic attribute of
citizenship.
Privacy is often cast as an individual's desire for seclusion from the pub-
lic realm. Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis made this strain of privacy
famous in their argument for a "right to be let alone." 37 This conception of
privacy implicitly articulates a particular vision of the individual's liberty in
society, namely that the individual should have the ability to withdraw and to
associate with others. This also shows that privacy rights define relation-
ships among citizens. 138
Competing theories of privacy are more direct in the link between pri-
vacy and governance. The autonomy theory of privacy argues that individu-
als have the right to define themselves for others and specifically interprets
privacy as necessary for political participation.139 This "right to control the
disclosure of personal information to others" sets the framework for private
social interaction as well as political interchange.140 The dignity theory calls
for privacy protection as a means for individuals to ratify their identity and
self.141 In effect, the protection of dignity would broadly set the constitu-
tional ground rules for an individual's interactions with others. Lastly, civil-
ity theory sees privacy as protection for community boundaries of
decency.142 Perhaps most directly, civility presents privacy as a key instru-
ment of social governance.
In a networked environment, individual identity and liberty are linked
intrinsically to the treatment of personal information.143 Data privacy rules
are often cast as a balance between two basic liberties: fundamental human
136. Usl6 Majt~nyi, Data Protection in the Era of Change of the Political System, in PROC.
XIXTH INT'L CONF., supra note 67, at 3.
137. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193,
195-96 (1890).
138. See also Schwartz, supra note 47, at 68 (arguing for "information territories" to define
relationships).
139. See WESTIN, supra note 14.
140. See Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L". 475,477 (1968).
141. See Edward . Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Ansver to Dean
Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962,965-66 (1964).
142. See Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the
Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957, 957 (1989) (arguing that the invasion-of-privacy tort
protects rules of civility but that the expansion of mass media poses an important threat to the
rules).
143. See Herbert Maisl, Etat de la legislation francaise et tendence de Ia jurisprudence rela-
tives a la protection des donneespersonelles, 1987 Rev. int'l de droit compare 559.
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rights on one side and the free flow of information on the other side.144 Yet,
because societies differ on how and when personal information should be
available for private and public sector needs, 145 the treatment and interaction
of these liberties will express a specific delineation between the state, civil
society, and the citizen.
B. Liberal Norms and Data Privacy
The liberal state emphasizes limits on government power and is charac-
terized by its hostility toward the regulation of private relations. In Lockean
terms, the role of the state is to protect propertyt 46 and the state is a force to
be restrained.147 For privacy, the liberal approach prefers private rights148
and regards the state with suspicion.149 In this context, personal information
needs to be protected from interference. State regulation should be sparse
and as narrowly constructed as possible. To the extent that the free flow of
information promotes private activity and autonomy, private contract, rather
than state regulation becomes the source of regulation for information. Indi-
viduals must vindicate their own rights.
The United States conceives of its democracy as such a liberal state. The
U.S. Constitution synthesizes commitments to self-governance and individ-
ual rights.1SO With these commitments, there is a strong anti-statist element.
Indeed, there is an ideological hostility to regulation of private relations de-
spite the rise of the social welfare state in America.1SI For information
flows, there is a reflexive impulse against any restrictions on the treatment of
personal information.S2 This draws on the powerful First Amendment tradi-
tion in the United States.
144. See Rigaux, supra note 105, at 3.
145. See Herbert J. Spiro, Privacy in Comparative Perspectives, in PRIVACY NOMOS XIII
121-22, 128 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1971) (noting that Americans more
readily share personal information with private organizations than government while continental
Europeans do the reverse and arguing that Germany and the United States are at polar positions
with respect to privacy while England falls in the middle).
146. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 70-73 (Thomas P. Peardon ed.,
Liberal Arts Press 1952) (1690).
147. See id. at 75-82.
148. See, e.g., David W. Leebron, The Right to Privacy's Place in the Intellectual History of
Tort Lam, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 769, 785-88 (1991) (discussing the liberal antimajoritarian
emphasis of Brandeis' approach to privacy).
149. See, e.g., Spiro, supra note 145, at 129-31.
150. See Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modem American Constitutionalism, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 523,579-90 (1995).
151. See Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 1423, 1424 (1982) (arguing that it was the development of the economic market in the nine-
teenth century that brought the public/private distinction into focus for the legal community).
152. See Reidenberg, Setting Standards, supra note 36, at 502-04.
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For the execution of First Principles, the liberal commitment has par-
ticular significance. Specifically, liberal politics are concerned with-coercive
state behavior15 3 Sectoral rather than omnibus laws minimize state intru-
sions on information processing. Sectoral laws, such as the Fair Credit Re-
porting Act,154 react to specific problems and provide only narrow state
intervention to protect privacy. For information privacy, this also means that
the public sector and police powers, rather than private conduct, are suspect.
The scope of legal protection executing First Principles under liberal
norms as seen in the Untied States is quite narrow. The political philosophy
of nonintervention translates into a narrow definition of personal informa-
tion. Discussion in the United States tends to exclude public record infor-
mation from protection as "personal information."155 This narrow definition,
in effect, places a limit on the state's power to regulate information privacy.
At the same time, the focus of any information privacy legislation will be
very narrow. Not surprisingly, in the United States, law targets discrete in-
formation processing activities and the most important legislative protections
for information privacy emphasize restraint on government. The Privacy Act
of 1974,156 the Freedom of Information Act of 1974,157 the Right to Financial
Privacy Act of 1978,158 and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
1986159 are exclusively or predominantly about the treatment of information
by the government.
Of equal importance under liberal theory is that markets, rather than law,
shape information privacy. Privacy is conceived as a fully alienable com-
modity and individual autonomy depends on the ability to make atomistic
decisions about the sale of personal information. Regulation is perceived to
intrude on the commitment to freedom from government interference in in-
formation flows.160 As a result, law emphasizes regulation of the market
process rather than the substantive contours of information privacy. The ex-
pectation is that the market will then execute the First Principles. This mar-
ket emphasis means that transparency should be the prime regulatory
focus.161 In the United States, for example, there are few legal restrictions on
153. See LOCKE, supra note 146, at 112-18 (describing tyranny as power beyond right).
154. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1998).
155. See, eg., SWIRE & LITAN, supra note 10, at 36 (noting the broader scope of public rec-
ords in the United States); McHugh, supra note 38, at 188-89 (citing Yahoo!'s chief marketing
officer's rationalization that Yahoo!'s user profiles are not personal information).
156. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1996).
157. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1996).
158. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (1994).
159. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522,2701-2711 (1994).
160. See, e.g., CATE, supra note 10, at 68-72.
161. Cate notes that a key feature of public sector privacy laws "is the emphasis, carried over
from First Amendmentjurisprudence, on ensuring widespread access to data to support democratic
self-governance." Id. at 76.
1343May 2000]
HeinOnline  -- 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1343 1999-2000
STANFORD LAWREVIEW
the collection, storage, or dissemination of information.162 The absence of
law also encourages the rise of information policy rules through technical
code.163 These technical rules embed information privacy decisions, or more
often privacy violations,64 in network architecture. Ultimately, they leave
the rule-making to private standards groups such as the Internet Engineering
Task Force 65 and the World Wide Web Consortium.166
For the market approach, three issues are of paramount importance: no-
tice, consent, and accuracy. In the United States, the sectoral statutes tend to
address accuracy of information.167 But, they do not give broad access to
personal information held by others. For example, there is no legal right in
the United States for an individual to compel Acxiomi6S to reveal the per-
sonal information that Acxiom sells about the inquiring person. This narrow
construction of the First Principle calling for rights of access 169 favors the
interests of those holding information about others. In staying true to Locke,
the narrow construction protects the effort of the collector of personal infor-
mation.
With respect to notice and consent, U.S. government policy stresses
these two elements of First Principles.170 Yet, the execution of these ele-
ments generally remains outside the boundaries of law and is left to the mar-
ketplace. The anti-state perspective disdains government interference in
162. See Reidenberg, Setting Standards, supra note 36, at 528-29.
163. See LESSIG, supra note 77; Reidenberg, ex Informatica, supra note 78.
164. Richard Smith, a technical expert, has, in pioneering work, identified the privacy inva-
sive architectures of a number ofpopular products such as the fingerprinting of Microsoft Office 97
files with a Global Unique Identifier (GUID) and Internet design features such as Web bugs that
preclude anonymous browsing. Richard M. Smith, Internet Privacy Issues <http://www.tiae.net/
users/smiths/privacy/>.
165. The Internet Engineering Task Force is, for example, working on IPv6, a protocol for
internet addressing, that will require a unique identifier for each machine connected to the Internet.
See Thomas Narten & R. Draves, Privacy Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in
Ipv6, at § 2 (Oct. 1999) <http:l/www.ietforglintemet-dmfts/draft-ietf-ipngwg-addrconf-privacy-
Ol.txt>.
166. W3C has sought to develop a number of technological privacy tools such as the Platform
for Internet Content Selection (PICS) and the Platform for Privacy Preferences (31). The M3C
Web site is at <http:/lwww.w3c.org>.
167. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1681i (1994) (Fair Credit Reporting Act error correction require-
ment); 15 U.S.C. § 1693(f) (1994) (Fair Credit Billing Act error correction requirement); Preserva-
tion of Records of Communication Common Carriers, 51 Fed. Reg. 32653 (1986) (to be codified at
47 C.F.R. pt. 42) (telephone billing regulations providing for dispute procedures).
168. Acxiom is one of the largest companies in the United States selling personal information
to direct marketers. See Axciom <http/www.acxiom.com>.
169. See text accompanying note 51, supra.
170. See, e.g., THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 8, at Issue 5 4 (stating that "principles of fair
information practice [] rest on the fundamental precepts of awareness and choice"); PRIVACY
WORKING GRoup, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 30 (relying principally on notice and
choice as the privacy paradigm for the Information Age).
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consensual decisions.'71 The most recent privacy legislation, contained in
the Financial Services Modernization Act,172 allows rampant sharing of per-
sonal information among corporate affiliates provided consumers are in-
formed periodically that their privacy will be violated. This approach
willfully ignores "public order" considerations such as the validity of consent
for certain types of processing activity.t73
Next, the American liberal philosophy minimizes execution of the First
Principle of finality. Purpose limitations on the use of collected personal
information are seen as contrary to the ideology of free flows of informa-
tion.174 In fact, one of the few statutes to impose purpose limitations on the
use of personal information, the Fair Credit Reporting Act,175 interprets the
purposes compatible with the rationale for collection broadly. The Fair
Credit Reporting Act explicitly allows the use of credit report for certain
marketing purposes; namely, to make unsolicited credit and insurance of-
fers. 176
Significantly, the American commitment to liberal values for informa-
tion flows is supported by the absence of public enforcement mechanisms for
First Principles. The sparse existence of legal rights proffers few judicial
remedies and there is no Data Protection Commission in the United States.
The state does not act as the direct protector of citizens. Instead of public
sanction, private initiative offers the principal means of enforcement of fair
information practices. By relying on private action, citizens must vindicate
their own interests and the opportunities for state interference with informa-
tion privacy are limited.177
171. Indeed, the U.S. Constitution also prohibits state interference with private contract. See
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. I ("No State shall. . . pass any... Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts."); Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819) (voiding the New
Hampshire legislature's attempt to modify a private college's charter).
172. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat.
1338.
173. For years, U.S. law has ignored the legitimacy of a patient's consent to the sharing of
medical information as a condition for insurance payment. A typical medical insurance form in-
cludes language such as the following: "I authorize any Health Care Provider, Insurance Company,
Employer, Person or Organization to release any information. .. to any CIGNA company, the Plan
Administrator, or their authorized agents for the purpose of validating and determining benefits
payable." Cigna HealthCare Group Medical Direct Reimbursement Claim Form (CL505517 2-96)
(on file with the StanfordLaiv Review). The release includes no obligation for CIGNA to keep the
information confidential, nor does it preclude CIGNA from using any acquired information for
other purposes. These terms are not negotiable.
174. See CATE, supra note 10, at 99 ("Privacy laws in the United States most often prohibit
certain disclosures, rather than collection, use, or storage, ofpersonal information.').
175. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1998).
176. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(c) (1998).
177. U.S. rhetoric typically refers pejoratively to any privacy regulator as a "czar." See, e.g.,
Remarks of Ambassador David L. Aaron, Under Sec'y of Conum. for Int'l Trade, U.S. DEP'T of
Comm., before the World Affairs Council Panel on the WTO & E-Commerce, Seattle, WA 3 (Nov.
12, 1999) <http:llwww.ita.doe.gov/mediaIEWTO1 12.htm>; Remarks of David L. Aaron, Under-
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By design, in this liberal approach, law is ad hoo and reactive. Faced
with rapidly changing, technologically driven uses of personal information,
the execution of many of the First Principles tends to fall by the wayside.178
Sectoral regulation is circumvented by cross-sectoral information processing
and key areas are intentionally ignored. Indeed, sectoral borders themselves
may be impossible to define.179 Non-economic values such as human dignity
do not enter into the calculus. At the same time, key conditions necessary
for the market to successfully account for privacy interests are missing.IB0
Basic transparency and informed consent are far from the reality in the
United'States.
The nonexecution of First Principles in the United States leads to an in-
teresting network effect.t1 Few restraints on information trafficking have
allowed an enormous volume of personal information to be collected and
disseminated. For those who seek customized products, the larger volume of
personal information in circulation gives business a greater ability to develop
those products.82 But, there is an important externality: It becomes harder
for individuals to maintain information privacy as more information about
others circulates. Profiling and inferential predictions based on aggregate
information affect each individual.183 The collective market treatment of
personal information restrains any individual's decisionmaking freedom.
While liberal objectives might be frustrated by the suppression of indi-
vidualism through market-dominated decisionmaking, the execution of First
Principles in the United States clearly enshrines a liberal philosophy. What-
ever criticism might be made regarding the sorry state of information privacy
in the United States, the free market, self-regulatory approach adopts gov-
ernance choices in the United States.
sec'y of Comm. for Int'l Trade, U.S. Dep't of Comm., before the Information Technology Associa-
tion of America Fourth Annual IT Policy Summit, Washington, DC 2 (Mar. 15, 1999)
<http:lwww.ita.doc.gov/medialItaapr3l599.htm>
178. See Reidenberg, supra note 57, at 775-76,779-80 (describing market failure and missing
elements of fair information practice); Schwartz & Reidenberg, supra note 9, at 338-90 (showing
lack of transparency).
179. See Reidenberg, Governing Networks, supra note 78, at 915-17 (discussing the break-
down of borders between substantive bodies of law); Robert M. Gellman, Can Privacy Be Regu-
lated Effectively on a National Level? Thoughts on the Possible Need for International Rules, 41
VILL. L. REV. 129, 143-45 (1996) (noting overlaps in sectoral industry codes of conduct).
180. See Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and the Economics of Personal Health Care Information,
76 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1997) (arguing that the operation and economics of complex economic markets,
health care and employment for example, actually favor data privacy protection).
181. See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Ef-
fects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479 (1998).
182. See Samarajiva, supra note 19, at 278-81. "In sum, mass customization requires the sur-
veillance of spatially dispersed, dynamic target markets and the building of relationships with cus-
tomers. Customized production goes with customized marketing, which goes with customer
surveillance. This is the surveillance imperative." Id. at 279.
183. See Simitis, supra note 64, at 726-29.
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C. Social-Protection Norms and Data Privacy
In contrast to the United States' liberal philosophy, other democracies,
typically European, approach information privacy from the perspective of
social protection. Under this governance philosophy, public liberty derives
from the community of individuals and law is the fundamental basis to pur-
sue norms of social and citizen protection.184 This vision of governance gen-
erally regards the state as the necessary player to frame the social community
in which individuals develop, 85 and information practices must serve indi-
vidual identity. 8 6 Citizen autonomy, in this view, effectively depends on a
backdrop of legal rights.
In this context, data privacy is a political imperative anchored in funda-
mental human rights protection.18 7 Citizens trust government more than the
private sector with personal information.88 Consequently, European democ-
racies approach data protection as an element of public law.189 Louise Ca-
doux, former Vice President of the French National Commission on Data
Processing and Liberties, succinctly notes: "[F]or Europe, the choice is
clear: privacy protection is an exclusive issue of law."19 0
184. See LAURENT COHEN-TANUGI, LE DROIT SANS L'ETAT: SUR LA DEMOCRATIE EN
FRANCE ET EN AMERIQUE 10 (1985) (noting that the American model of "a 'contractual society'
opposes naturally the other great model of regulation, the Social Contract, a meta-contract uniting
the entire society to the creation of a State by a general and absolute delegation of power from the
former to the second) (translation by author).
185. See Rigaux, supra note 105 (arguing that privacy is one of several competing freedoms
that must be decided on by the legislature); Yves Poullet, Data Protection Between Property and
Liberties: A Civil Law Approach, in AMONGST FRIENDS IN COMPUTERS AND LAW 170-71, 175
(H.W.K. Kaspersen & A. Oskamp eds., 1990) (noting that civil law looks to create fundamental
privacy rights).
186. As an example, the very first sentence of the French data privacy law is "computer proc-
essing must serve the citizen." See Law No. 78-17 of Jan. 6, 1978, at art. 1 <http:llwww.cnil.fr/
textes/text02.htm>.
187. See COE Convention, supra note 14, at preamble & art. 1. The Convention provides:
Considering that it is desirable to extend the safeguards for everyone's rights and fundamental
freedoms, and in particular the right to the respect for privacy, taking account ofthe increasing
flow across frontiers of personal data undergoing automatic processing .... [Art. 11 The pur-
pose of this convention is to secure in the territory of each Party for every individual, whatever
his nationality or residence, respect for his rights and fundamental freedoms, and in particular
his right to privacy, with regard to automatic processing of personal data relating to him ("data
protection").
Id.
188. See Spiro, supra note 145, at 122.
189. See generally T. Koopmans, Privacy and the Dilemmas of Human Rights Protection, in
PROC. XVITH INT'L CONF. DATA PROT. COMM'RS 72, 72-77 (Sept. 1994) <http://cwis.kub.nl/
--dbi/regkamer/proc.htm> [hereinafter XVITH INT'L CONF.] (discussing the development of data
protection in European jurisprudence); Peter Blume, Legal Culture and the Possibilities of Control,
in 3 LECTURES ONDATA PROTECTION 19,35 (1992).
190. Louise Cadoux, Autoroutes de l'information et vieprivee: ethique, auto-regulation et oi,
in PROC. XIXTH INT'L CONF., supra note 67 (translated by author).
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To assure social protection, data protection norms in Europe interpose
the state in creating parity between organizations and individuals. France
and the European Data Protection Directive, for example, prohibit the use of
purely automated decisions about citizens.91 This socially-protective ap-
proach to regulation seeks to manage relationships and fully execute First
Principles. Law, thus, enshrines prophylactic protection through comprehen-
sive rights and responsibilities.1 92 The scope of coverage is expansive.
European data protection laws are cross-sectoral, affecting all industries and
the public sector.193 Indeed, the commitment to free flows of information is
far narrower than in the liberal approach. For example, in the interest of as-
suring freedom of speech, European journalists enjoy some exceptions to the
rules for processing personal information.194 But, these exceptions are
weaker than the First Amendment protections afforded to journalists in the
United States, where virtually any restriction will be attacked as unconstitu-
tional.195
Under the social-protection approach, the execution of First Principles
emphasizes the legitimacy of processing personal information. Not surpris-
ingly, European law rejects consent as an absolute basis for the treatment of
personal data.196 In addition, European law insists on the "fair] and law-
ful["processing of personal information.197 The interpretation of legitimacy
will, however, be circumscribed by the extent of the social protection sought.
For example, the United Kingdom and Germany, until transposition of the
European Data Protection Directive, did not explicitly control the processing
of sensitive data,198 while France and Belgium did. 199 These latter countries
191. See Law No. 78-17 of Jan. 6, 1985, 1978 <http://wv.cnil.fr/textes/textO2.btrn>; Euro-
pean Data Protection Directive, supra note 11, at art. 15(1).
192. See Swimr & LITAN, supra note 10, at 22-31 (discussing the application of the European
Directive's privacy protections in Europe); Schwartz, supra note 12.
193. See European Data Protection Directive, supra note 11, at recital 12, art. 3(1).
194. See id. at art. 9 ("Member States shall provide for exemptions... for the processing of
personal data carried out solely for journalistic purposes....").
195. See SwIRa & LTAN, supra note 10, at 31 ("The use of 'only' and 'necessary' suggest
that free expression will prevail over privacy rights less often than would be true under the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution?); Jane Elizabeth Kirtley, Privacy and the News Media: A
Question of Trust, or of Control?, in PaOC. XXIST INT'L CONF., supra note 44 (criticizing the
European Data Protection Directive as restrictive of press freedoms)
196. See European Data Protection Directive, supra note 11, at art. 8 (requiring protection for
sensitive data).
197. See id. at art 6.
198. The U.K. Data Protection Act of 1984 allowed the Secretary of State to issue regulations
for four types of sensitive data, but none were ever issued. See Data Protection Act, 1984, § 2(3)
(Eng.). The German law incorporated higher protection of sensitive data through a balancing
clause. See REIDENBERG & SCHWARTZ, supra note 43, at 96-97.
199. See COMMISSION DE PROTECTION DE LA VIE PRIVtE, 1996 RAPPORT D'ACT1VITE 38
(1997) (noting that advance consent is required for processing sensitive data in Belgium); Law No.
78-17 of Jan. 6, 1978, at art 31 <http:llwww.cnil.fr/textesltextO2.htm>.
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had, perhaps, a stronger tradition of state paternalism than the United King-
dom or Germany.
Finality is similarly a key element of social protection. European data
protection law places a critical finality restriction on the processing of per-
sonal information.200 To assure the enforcement of First Principles, public
oversight mechanisms also embody the social protective approach. Euro-
pean data protection law establishes powerful state supervisory agencies. 201
Indeed, Denmark even calls its public agency the "Data Surveillance
Authority."202 These agencies accomplish their mission through declaratory
schemes and licensing.203 Criminal sanctions are also a feature of public en-
forcement in many states.204 These contrast dramatically with the liberal ap-
proach, which eschews such deep state involvement in the regulation of
information flows.
Although social-protection norms pervade the execution of First Princi-
ples in European democracies, divergences do exist.205 The scope of cover-
age of data protection laws is broader, for example, in France and Belgium
than in the United Kingdom.206 In Germany, there is even an explicit man-
date to provide anonymous and pseudonymous online interactions.207 These
diverging scopes appear to reflect the respective political cultures of state
involvement in the private sector; France and Belgium have a Colbertist tra-
dition of governance, whereas the United Kingdom is more independent and
200. See European Data Protection Directive, supra note 11, at art. 6 ("Member States shall
provide that personal data must be ... collected for specified, explicit, and legitimate purposes and
not further processed in a way incompatible with those purposes.").
201. See id. at art. 28 ("Each Member State shall provide that one or more public authorities
are responsible for monitoring the application within its territory of the provisions adopted by the
Member States.").
202. See Data Surveillance Authority <http://www.registertilsynet.dk/eng/index.html>.
203. See BENNETT, supra note 10; FLAHERTY, supra note 14 (discussing the role, politics,
and operation of data protection agencies); European Data Protection Directive, supra note 11, art.
19 (describing the information that must be provided to the supervising agency prior to a data col-
lection).
204. See, e.g., DIRECTORATE FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRY, OECD,
INVENTORY OF INSTRUMENTS AND MECHANISMS CONTRIBUTING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF THE OECD PRIVACY GUIDELINES ON GLOBAL NETWORKS, OECD Doc.
DSTI/ICCP/REG(98)12/FINAL at 18-50 (May 11, 1999) <http'//www.olis.oecd.orglolis/1998doc.
nsf/4cf568b5b9dad99412567lb004bed59/0663flef6343f3a78025677dOO529a52/SFIL./05E95540
.ENG> (reporting on implementation of OECD guidelines and noting relevant criminal sanctions in
various countries).
205. See FLAHERTY, supra note 14 (analyzing differences in public sector regulation of data
privacy); REIDENBERG & SCHWARTZ, supra note 43 (studying divergences across several European
national laws).
206. See notes 82-86supra and accompanying text (discussing the definition of "identifiable"
information).
207. See REIDENBERG & SCHWARTZ, supra note 43, at 39-40 ("The IuKDG requires service
providers 'to offer the user anonymous use and payment of teleservices or use and payment under a
pseudonym to the extent technically feasible and reasonable.").
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the modem German history of the Holocaust offers a compelling motive to
promote anonymity. Transparency rules in Europe also include differing
levels of intrusiveness for the collectors and users of personal information.
The notices to individuals for the processing of personal information and the
registration statements that must be filed with national supervisory authori-
ties vary in their details. 208
For the online context, the social-protection approach has an important
conceptual appeal. The approach is cross-sectoral and inclusive; personal
information receives privacy protection regardless of the processing ar-
rangement. In contrast, the liberal approach restricts protection to increas-
ingly irrelevant sectoral boundaries. At the same time, however, the social-
protection approach poses normative challenges. The complexity of data-
processing architectures on the Internet makes the application of First Princi-
ples to particular contexts difficult. An illustration of this point is found in
the registration mechanisms designed to assure transparency. With respect to
online services, these requirements can prove rather onerous and problem-
atic. In fact, there is a debate as to the effectiveness of compliance and en-
forcement.209 Beyond this implementation of First Principles, the interpreta-
tion of standards poses additional problems. Small divergences and ambi-
guities will distort the structure and flows of personal information.210 Differ-
ences in the treatment of Internet Protocol addresses may, for example, affect
where service providers locate address servers.
In the face of the growing issues of divergence with European data pro-
tection laws despite the shared governance philosophy, harmonization of in-
formation privacy rules became an important goal. The European
Commission proposed a Directive in 1990,211 but the adoption did not con-
clude until enactment five years later of Directive 95/46/EC. In the inter-
vening years, Europe sought deeper political integration following the
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union.2M While there is no
overt linkage between the political integration of the European Union fol-
lowing the Maastricht Treaty and the final enactment of the data protection
directive, the Maastricht Treaty did push European political governance to-
ward greater convergence.2 3 Indeed, the European Data Protection Directive
208. See id. at 131-35 (examining variations in requirements between European Union Mem-
ber States).
209. See Existing Case-Law, supra note 110.
210. See REIDENBERG & SCHWARTZ, supra note 43, at 139-46.
211. See Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning the Protection of Individuals in Rela-
tion to the Processing of Personal Data, COM(90)314 final.
212. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.L (C 224) 1 <http://europa.eu.intleur-
lex/en/treaties/datleu cons treatyen.pdf>.
213. See, eg., Armin Von Bogdandy, The Legal Case for Unity: The European Union as a
Single Organization with a Single Legal System, 36 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 887 (1999) (arguing
that the European Union is creating a unitary legal order).
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Most jurisdictions, however, have declined to exempt oral contraceptives
from the learned intermediary rule.35 Courts emphasize that, "although a
greater degree of patient participation may be involved in the choice of a pre-
scription contraceptive than in some other prescription drugs, the physician
makes the ultimate decision as to whether a particular contraceptive re-
quested by the patient is appropriate. '36 The physician still exercises indi-
vidualized medical judgment. He or she typically "evaluate[s] a patient's
medical and family history to elicit potential risk factors, perform[s] a physi-
cal examination" and, in cases where a prescription is issued, "determine[s]
the appropriate type and dosage to prescribe for a particular patient. 37
Courts also argue that the existence of serious side effects associated with
oral contraceptives only underscores the importance of the physician's role
in the evaluation of risks and benefits associated with their use.38 Direct
marketing to consumers and the FDA requirements for patient package in-
serts do not undermine the physician's crucial role in prescribing oral contra-
ceptives.39 Finally, opponents of the exception argue, "[t]he fact that oral
contraceptives do not usually require frequent check-ups bespeaks of the im-
portance of the initial decision to prescribe them and fails to provide a prin-
cipled basis to depart from the learned intermediary doctrine." 40
Despite the widespread justification of the learned intermediary doctrine
in reproductive health cases, critics of the doctrine have used the rationales
supporting the oral contraceptive exception as a springboard for advocating
additional exceptions to the rule. The reasoning behind the oral contracep-
tive exception could arguably be extended to other drugs and medical de-
vices such as those with high risks of side effects; 41 those prescribed elec-
35. See MacPherson v. G.D. Searle & Co., 775 F. Supp. 417, 425 (D.D.C. 1991) (applying
District of Columbia law); Reaves v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 765 F. Supp. 1287, 1290-91 (E.D. Mich.
1991) (applying Michigan law); Zanzuri v. G.D. Searle & Co., 748 F. Supp. 1511, 1514-15 (S.D.
Fla. 1990) (applying Florida law); Allen v. G.D. Searle & Co., 708 F. Supp. 1142, 1147-48 (D. Or.
1989) (applying Oregon law); Spychala v. G.D. Searle & Co., 705 F. Supp. 1024, 1031-33 (D.N.J.
1988) (applying New Jersey law); Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 680 F. Supp. 1293, 1305-06 (D.
Minn. 1988) (applying Minnesota law); Stafford v. Nipp, 502 So. 2d 702, 704 (Ala. 1987); West v.
Searle & Co., 806 S.W.2d 608, 613-14 (Ark. 1991); Lacy v. G.D. Searle & Co., 567 A.2d 398, 400
(Del. 1989); Humes v. Clinton, 792 P.2d 1032, 1040-41 (Kan. 1990); Taurino v. Ellen, 579 A.2d
925, 927 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990), appeal denied, 589 A.2d 693 (Pa. 1991); Terhune v. A.H. Robins
Co., 577 P.2d 975, 978-79 (Wash. 1978).
36. Allen, 708 F. Supp. at 1148.
37. Reaves, 765 F. Supp. at 1290.
38. See id. at 1291.
39. For a discussion of direct-to-consumer advertising, see notes 59-80 infra and accompa-
nying text. For a discussion of FDA regulations requiring direct warnings, see notes 48-58 infra
and accompanying text.
40. Walsh, supra note I, at 867.
41. See Ferrara v. Beflex Lab., Inc., 732 F. Supp. 552 (E.D. Penn. 1990) (rejecting the argu-
ment that the especially dangerous nature of the anti-depressant drug Nardil wan-anted a direct
warning to users).
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tively by patients for use over a long period of time;42 those for which the
FDA requires a PPI;43 and those prescription drugs marketed directly to con-
sumers.44
2. Intrauterine devices and breast implants.
Relying on the rationales behind the oral contraceptive exception, plain-
tiffs' attorneys and others have vigorously argued, for instance, that excep-
tions to the learned intermediary rule also be carved out for intrauterine de-
vices (IUDs) and breast implants.45 Efforts in this area, however, have met
with very limited success. Courts have uniformly declined to impose a direct
duty to warn patients in the case of breast implants, and only one court has
imposed such a duty in the case of IUDs. Standing alone, the Eighth Circuit
in Hill v. Searle Laboratories46 held that the learned intermediary rule should
not apply to the IUD for the same reasons other courts had not applied it to
oral contraceptives. 47
3. FDA regulations requiring direct warnings.
Some critics of the learned intermediary doctrine advocate an exception
to that rule when the FDA has mandated direct patient warnings. Federal
regulations promulgated by the FDA currently require manufacturers to sup-
ply PPIs for a number of products, including all isoproterenol inhalation
preparations, prescription-only contraceptives, estrogens, and progestational
drug products.48 Violation of the federal regulations-by failure to include a
42. Intrauterine devices and breast implants fall under this rubric. For a discussion of efforts
to carve out exceptions to the learned intermediary doctrine in this area, see notes 45-47 infra and
accompanying text.
43. For a discussion of efforts to carve out such an exception to the learned intermediary doc-
trine, see notes 48-58 infra and accompanying text.
44. For a discussion of efforts to carve out a direct-to-consumer advertising exception to the
learned intermediary doctrine, see notes 59-80 infra and accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., Desmarais v. Dow Coming Corp., 712 F. Supp. 13, 17 n.5 (D. Conn. 1989) (re-
jecting plaintiffs request to establish a breast implant exception to the learned intermediary rule);
Lee v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 721 F. Supp. 89, 94-95 (D. Md. 1989), aff'd, 898 F.2d 146 (4th Cir.
1990) (denying plaintiff recovery under the learned intermediary doctrine in a ruptured breast
prosthesis case); Casey, supra note 25, at 952-54 (advocating a breast implant exception to the
learned intermediary rule). Although not prescription drugs per se, intrauterine devices and breast
implants are medical devices, available only through a physician, which illustrate attempts to carve
out exceptions to the learned intermediary rule.
46. 884 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1989).
47. See id. at 1070-71 (reasoning that birth control decisions are made independently by the
patient, thereby reducing the physician's role in making an individualized medical judgment).
48. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.305 (1998) (isoproterenol inhalation preparations, used in the treat-
ment of bronchial asthma); id. § 310.501(a), (b) (oral contraceptives); id. § 310.501a (medroxypro-
gesterone acetate injectable for contraception); id. § 310.502 (intrauterine devices); id. § 310.515
(estrogens, hormones used to therapeutically prevent or stop lactation and to improve malignant
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November 1997 Ministerial Summit in Turku,224 the February 1998 work-
shop on privacy22S and the Ottawa Summit,226 the OECD has reasserted its
role in data protection, particularly in the context of electronic commerce and
online activities. Although the OECD strives to examine data privacy in a
cross-sectoral manner,227 it continues to emphasize the economic perspective
on data protection; attention is paid to "users" and "consumers," rather than
"citizens." This institutional emphasis draws on the liberal governance
model for data protection.
In contrast, from the citizen's rights perspective, the Council of Europe
has also begun to address the application of privacy principles to the Internet.
In May 1998, the Council of Europe released "Draft Guidelines for the pro-
tection of individuals with regard to the collection and processing of personal
data on the information highway, which may be incorporated in or annexed
to Codes of Conduct," and by February 1999 the Internet guidelines were
adopted.228 Interestingly, the Council of Europe specifically sought to de-
velop these Internet privacy guidelines in conjunction with the European
Commission and these guidelines follow a social-protection model. The
guidelines reiterate the basic obligations of data collectors and detail the
ways in which those collectors should satisfy their data protection obliga-
tions.
These institutions clearly want to preserve their relevance and secure an
important role in the field of Internet privacy policy. In the Internet context,
countries like the United States, with a commitment to liberal governance
norms, will clearly support OECD efforts. This does not, however, preclude
active participation from countries with social-protection governance norms.
To the extent that such countries can influence the results of OECD efforts,
points of divergence and conflict may be reduced.
2. New entrants.
Despite the reawakening of the OECD and the Council of Europe, these
institutions face competition from new entrants to data protection policy that
draw heavily on liberal governance norms. The World Trade Organization
(WTO), a creation of the Uruguay Round negotiations of the General
224. See Dismantling the Barriers to Global Electronic Commerce: International Conference,
OECD Doc. No. DSTIIICCP(98)13/FINAL (JuL. 3, 1998) <htip'./lvww.oecd.orgldstilsti/itleclprodl
turkufin.pdf>.
225. See OECD, PRIVACY PROTECTION IN A GLOBAL NETWORKED SOCIETY: AN OECD
INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY ADVISORY
COMMITTEE, OECD DOC. NO. DSTL/ICCP/REG(98)5/FINAL <http:llwww.oecd.org/dsti/sti/it/
secur/prod/reg98-5final.pdf> [hereinafter GLOBAL NETWORKED SOCIETY].
226. See A Borderless World, supra note 8; Ministerial Declaration, supra note 68.
227. The OECD Guidelines, for example, apply to all sectors.
228. See Processing ofPersonalData, supra note 68.
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Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,229 will inevitably become involved in data
protection and will face privacy issues from the organization's historical
commitment to trade liberalization, growth of economic markets, and con-
straints on state behavior. Indeed, the services provisions of the new trade
accords prohibit signatories from imposing restrictions on transborder data
flows.230 While these provisions grant exceptions for privacy-related restric-
tions, they still preclude each signatory country from taking discriminatory
action against other signatories.231 Consequently, the WTO will have juris-
diction to hear complaints against any national restraint on transborder data
flows.232 The WTO must also initiate studies of issues that affect interna-
tional trade.233 Information flows and data protection will clearly be relevant
and unavoidable under this mandate. 34 The emphasis will draw on distinctly
liberal norms.
The other main intergovernmental entrant is the World Intellectual Prop-
erty Organization (WIPO).235 Although the mission of the WIPO is to pro-
mote intellectual property protection and rights management, the digital
environment merges many intellectual property rights issues with those of
data protection. Data protection has implications for the ownership rights to
data and the mechanisms for electronic rights management have implications
for the fair treatment of personal information.236 The WIPO cannot ignore
the study of data protection as it moves toward the adaptation of intellectual
property rights for electronic commerce.
Outside of intergovernmental organizations, technical standards bodies
have become stealth entrants. As non-governmental organizations, these
groups represent the market forces of liberal norms. These bodies establish
technical rules that embed policies for the international flow of personal in-
formation. The technical capabilities of new systems have critical ramifica-
229. See FINAL ACT EMBODYING THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION (1994) <ht p:l/wwv.wto.orglwto/eolle/pdf/04-wto.pdf> [hereinafter AGREEMENT
ESTABLISHING THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION].
230. See General Agreement on Trade in Services, in AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 229, at Annex 1B, art. XIV(c)(ii) <http.//iwww.wto.orgt
wto/eol/e/pdf/26-gats.pdf>.
231. See id.-at art. XIV(c)(ii).
232. For a discussion of possible WTO claims, see Shaffer, supra note 129, at 46-55.
233. See id. at art. XXIV (creating Council for Trade in Services).
234. In fact, the European Commission has requested consideration of data privacy issues by
the Council for Trade in Services. See Mario Monti, The Internet and Privacy: What Regulation
(May 9, 1998) <http:/europa.eu.int/conmn/intemalmarket/en/speeches/romeO598.htm>.
235. See World Intellectual Property Organization <http://www.viipo.org>.
236. See Graham Greenleaf, 'IP, Phone Home' ECMS, ©-Tech, and Protecting Privacy
Against Surveillance by Digital Works, in PROC. XXIST INT'L CONF., supra note 44; Lee Bygrave
& Kamiel Koelnaan, Privacy, Data Protection and Copyright: Their Interaction in the Context of
Electronic Copyright Management Systems (June 1998) <http://www.imprimatur.alcs.co.uk/
IMP_FTP/privreportdef.pdft.
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tions for data protection. For example, the results of reforms to the domain
name system for the Internet may make localization of users and servers easy
or impossible. Organizations such as the World Wide Web Consortium
(W3C),237 the Internet Society,s the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
(LANA) (now replaced by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers (ICANN)),239 and the Internet Ehgineering Task Force (IETF)240
are each forming data protection policies, though often inadvertently.
These new entrants, in any case, will reflect norms of information pri-
vacy from liberal governance rather than social protection. They focus on
market development and the allocation of economic interests. The WTO's
guiding principle is to increase international trade. The WIPO's mission is to
secure intellectual property rights for creators to commercialize their work.
And, the prime mission of technical standards bodies, like W3C and IETF, is
to promulgate technical standards for market adoption. Nevertheless, propo-
nents of social-protection norms for information privacy have much to gain
by working with these new entrants. The constituencies are different from
the traditional institutions and the opportunity to find accommodations is
valuable.
B. Technical Codes of Conduct
These key institutional players reflect a mix of public law-making insti-
tutions and rule-setting bodies. The divergence in governance norms, how-
ever, assures that attempts to create public law instruments executing First
Principles will not satisfactorily resolve data privacy issues for global infor-
mation networks. International cooperation can, however, focus on technical
standards and private solutions as a means to bridge these governance con-
flicts.
Standards decisions, in effect, mix technical issues with policy
choices.241 The Berlin Group, an organization of national data protection
supervisory agencies, has recognized this effect for data protection and iden-
tified a set of technical design issues to assure the implementation of First
237. See W3C, About the World Wide Web Consortium <http://www.w3.org/Consortiuni/>.
238. See Internet Society Mission Statement <http:llwww.isoc.orgtisocfniission/>.
239. See The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers <http://www.icann.
orgY.
240. For a useful history of these organizations by one of the founders, see Vint Cert, IETF
andISOC, July 18, 1995 <http://www.isoc.orgisoc/related/ietf/>.
241. See LESSIG, supra note 77, at 6 (arguing that technical codes regulate cyberspace); Lor-
rie Faith Cranor, The Role of Technology in Sef-Regulatory Privacy Schemes, in PRIVACY AND
SELF-REGULATION IN THE INFORMATION AGE (1997) <httlAwwv.ntia.doc.gov/reports/privacy/
selfreg5.htmn#5B> (discussing the capabilities of technology to provide solutions for privacy pro-
tection).
May 2000] 1355
HeinOnline  -- 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1355 1999-2000
STANFORD LAWREVIEW
Principles on global networks.242 In reality, technical choices are "codes of
conduct" implementing First Principles just like trade association policy
statements seek to define information practices. Technical standards, com-
bined with their deployment and implementation, offer a direct guaranty of
fair information practices in any information transfer.243 These standards
operate at the network level and can be independent of national borders. For
example, if the infrastructure of an online payment system only allows
anonymous transactions, data protection is absolute wherever the transaction
takes place on the network.244 Alternatively, an infrastructure that uses
trusted third parties to authenticate and verify the identity of participants in
the online payment system may automatically assure fair treatment of per-
sonal information by some participants, but not others.245
By incorporating data protection within the infrastructure's architecture,
technical solutions may specifically be used to arbitrate divergences in na-
tional laws.246 The W3C's "Platform for Privacy Preferences" (P3P)247 ini-
tiative, for example, might one day serve this purpose if server-based
filtering can be used to identify and protect against deviations from a juris-
242. These principles are: sensitive data must be encrypted; information and communications
technologies must enable users to control and give feedback with regard to his personal data;
anonymous access to online services should be available; secure encryption methods must be a
legitimate option for Internet users; and quality stamp certification should be explored to improve
transparency for users. See International Working Group on Data Protection in Telecommunica-
tions (WGDPT), Report and Guidance on Data Protection and Privacy on the Internet, Apr. 16,
1996 <http:llww.datenschutz-berlin.de/doc/lntliwgdptbbmem-en.htm> [hereinafter IWGDPT,
Report and Guidance].
243. See Reidenberg, Lex Inforinatica, supra note 78, at 581; see also Lessig, Constitution in
Cyberspace, supra note 78, at 898-99 (arguing that technical code is self-enforcing); Reidenberg,
Governing Networks, supra note 78, at 918 (arguing that technical decisions set default rules).
244. See Paul F. Syverson, Stuart G. Stubblebine & David M. Goldschlag, Unlinkable Serial
Transactions, in FINANCIAL CRYPTOGRAPHY (Rafael Hirschfed ed., 1997) <http://www.cs.
columbia.edu/-stu/97fc.pdf> (proposing alternatives to rectify conflict of interest between service
providers and users with respect to personal information).
245. See, e.g., eCash Technologies, Information for New eCash Issuers <http:llwwvw.
ecashtechnologies.com> (allowing for the exchange of ecash payment for goods and services while
maintaining security and anonymity for users); David Chaum, Privacy Technology, in PROC.
XVITH INT'L CONF., supra note 189.
246. See Working Party Established under Art. 29 of Directive 95/46/EC, RECOMMENDATION
1/99 ON INVISIBLE AND AUTOMATIC PROCESSING OF PERSONAL DATA ON THE INTERNET
PERFORMED BY SOFTVARE AND HARDWARE, E.C. Doe. No. DG XV 5093/98 WPI17 (1999)
<http://europa.eu.intcorm/internal-marketen/media/dataprotfwpdocs/wpl7en.htm> (noting the
rule making capacity of software and hardware to support or frustrate European privacy norms);
Working Party Established under Art. 29 of Directive 95/46/EC, OPINION 1/98: PLATFORM FOR
PRIVACY PREFERENCES (P3P) AND THE OPEN PROFILING STANDARD (OPS), E.C. Doe. No. XV
D15032198 WP 11 (1998) <http.//europa.eu.int/comm/dgl5/entmedia/dataprotlwpdocs/wpllen.htm>
[hereinafter WORKING PARTY, PLATFORM FOR PRIVACY PREFERENCES] (suggesting that technical
standards might operate within the European legal framework to assure the protection of privacy in
international data flows).
247. See W3C, The Platform for Privacy Preferences 1.0 (P3P1.0) Specification, Nov. 2,
1999 <http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/WD-P3P-19991102>.
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diction's mandatory rules.248 In particular, P3P might be able to bridge the
conflict between the European Union and the United States by assuring
"adequate" protection in connection with data flows to the United States.
Intelligent agents, as another example, might be used to protect against the
secondary use of stored personal information.249 Agents could be developed
to monitor the use of personal information and signal any deviation from
specified uses. In either case, such arbitration can maximize international
data flows without compromising data protection rules and governance
norms.
In this respect, technical arrangements might effectively narrow the
scope of divergences in the execution of First Principles. For example, to the
extent that technological features make Internet interactions anonymous, data
protection issues are minimized or inapplicable. If an Internet protocol ad-
dress is assigned dynamically so that only the service provider can identify
the Web surfer, then a Web site will not know, without more data, who the
surfer is. Such features may, however, prove elusive where hidden tools like
Web bugs or cookies undercut anonymity. Similarly, to the extent that
transparency requirements and registration requirements diverge according to
liberal or social protective approaches to First Principles, technological tools
might allow the automated satisfaction of different rules for the same trans-
action. Different notices might be served to users in jurisdictions with spe-
cific content requirements and registrations might be automatically generated
if data collection occurs in jurisdictions requiring declaration to public
authorities. This assumes a circumvention of the Internet's geographic in-
determinacy. Likewise, technical restraints analogous to electronic rights-
management protocols might be developed to assure finality according to
varying obligations. Security protocols can be deployed to prevent all but
authorized uses of personal data.
From the perspective of existing data protection regulatory authorities,
the treatment of standards as well as their implementation as "codes of con-
duct" offer a way to avoid governance confrontations. For example, the
more recent data protection laws such as the Dutch law and the European
Data Protection Directive include procedures for the approval of industry
248. See WORKING PARTY, PLATFORM FOR PRIVACY PREFERENCES, supra note 246 (noting
that European norms need to be incorporated in the technical specifications); see also Joel R. Rei-
dcnberg, The Use of Technology to Assure Internet Privacy: Adapting Labels and Filters for Data
Protection, 3 LEX ELECTRONICA (Winter 1997) <http://www.lex-electronica.org/articles/v3-2/
reidenbe.htmnl>.
249. See International Working Group on Data Protection in Telecommunications, Common
Position on Intelligent Softare Agents, Apr. 29, 1999 <http://vww.datenschutz-berlin.de/doc/int/
iwgdpt/agent.en.htm>; Netherlands Registratiekamer, Intelligent Software Agents and Technology:
Turning a Privacy Threat Into a Protector (1999) <http:llwww.registratiekamer.nl/bistop_2_
5.html>.
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codes of conduct.50 This moves privacy protection to a new forum-the
organization preparing the code of conduct. Nevertheless, the forum shift
does not vitiate the key role of data protection agencies. Regulators will ex-
amine how the codes execute the First Principles and how representative the
code will be.251 If technical codes are included within this purview, then the
procedural device can encourage the creation of an infrastructure designed to
assure data protection rather than challenge it. Data protection regulators can
approve technical codes and implementation configurations like industry
policy guidelines. As a consequence, non-European information privacy
rules and their national governance norms would lose relevance for Europe-
ans because the technical codes and configurations would assure execution
of the First Principles. Through technical standards, international data flows
can respect diverging governance norms through automated compliance rules
that satisfy obligations in both the home and host countries. Significantly,
multiple technical standards can coexist for information flows in cyber-
space.2 52 Hence, one standard that might satisfy the disclosure requirements
in a given country does not preclude simultaneous use of another standard
that assures finality in a different country. The biggest obstacles will be the
time necessary to reach agreement on a code and the take-it or leave-it choice
that some companies may find difficult.
C. Multistakeholder Summits
Although technical codes of conduct can minimize the conflict among
divergent information privacy norms, the dynamic nature of information
processing in the online environment means that national governments must
have an ongoing dialog with all stakeholders, including industry and privacy
advocacy groups as well as independent experts and scholars. Such an open
dialog is crucial to the future of international data flows and the development
of coherent policies.
The OECD Workshop on Privacy in February 1998253 and the White
House conference on privacy in June 1998254 are useful models for this form
250. See European Data Protection Directive, supra note 11, at art. 30(1) (d).
251. See Working Party Established under Art. 29 of Directive 95/46/EC, FUTURE WORK ON
CODES OF CONDUCT: WORKING DOCUMENT ON THE PROCEDURES FOR THE CONSIDERATION BY
THE WORKING PARTY OF COMMUNITY CODES OF CONDUCT, E.C. Doc. DG XII D/5004/98 ,VPI3
(1998) <http://europa.eu.int/conimimtemal marketlmedialdataprotlwpdocslwpl3en.htm>.
252. This conceptual insight underlies the W3C movement for P3P. The technical protocol
for P3P allows multiple privacy ratings and filtering to coexist.
253. See generally GLOBAL NETWORKED SOCIETY, supra note 225.
254. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, Public Meeting, supra note 219. The meeting
was designed as a forum to discuss issues for the Commerce Department and the Office of Man-
agement and Budget (OMB) report to the President on self-regulation and Internet privacy. See
National Telecomm. and Info. Admin., U.S. Dep't of Comm., Elements of Effective Self Regula-
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of multi-interest summitry. Though few substantive advances were
achieved, dialog and information sharing occurred among the private sector,
academic experts, advocates, and government. The business lobby is in-
creasingly seeking to synthesize data protection into a notice and consent
framework, so this type of multistakeholder approach helps preserve consen-
sus on the First Principles and may lead to greater governance convergence
for implementation.
At the international level, the OECD is a logical organization to convene
such conferences. The OECD has experience in fostering diAlog between
government and business.255 More recently, however, the OECD has been
quite sympathetic to business and less directly concerned with citizen's
rights. For example, the Business and Industry Advisory Committee is a
nonvoting, accredited observer,25 6 but no privacy organizations have such
official observer status.257 Although many country delegations to the OECD
contain representation from national data protection regulators, the U.S.
delegation does not, and it typically plays a significant role at intergovern-
mental meetings, stressing the liberal, market approach. The success of fu-
ture summits will, thus, depend on the balance achieved between the airing
of business views and the critiques of those without commercial interests at
stake.
For the OECD to continue to proceed effectively, it must seek the par-
ticipation of each of the interest groups. Accreditation for privacy organiza-
tions and the formation of a standing expert advisory committee will be
necessary. Such multi-interest summits should occur on a biennial basis to
assure sufficient frequency and high-level participation.
D. General Agreement on Information Privacy
While technical codes and international summitry may facilitate the co-
existence of divergent executions of First Principles, fundamental differences
are likely to persist in areas where governance norms force a clash of public
order.258 When, for example, data privacy violations have criminal sanc-
tions, divergences may be hard to coregulate. The treatment of sensitive data
presents such a case. Where consent is rejected as a basis for processing
tion for the Protection of Privacy and Questions Related to Online Privacy, June 5, 1998
<http:llww.ntia.doe.gov/ntiahomelprivacyl_5_98fedreg.htm>.
255. For example, the OECD consults regularly with the Business and Industry Advisory
Committee, an international consortium of trade associations. See OECD and the Public <http://
www.oecd.orglaboutpublic/index.htm>.
256. SeeAboutBLIC<http:lwww.biae.orgtbiae.htn>.
257. The Trans Atlantic Consumer Dialogue, a consortium of national consumer groups, is
also an observer to the OECD, but is not expressly a privacy organization.
258. See Goldsmith, supra note 114, at 1210 (discussing the relative ease of resolving con-
flicts between default rules as compared with mandatory laws).
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certain forms of personal information,259 such as medical information, tech-
nical rules based on consent cannot function to arbitrate among divergent
national laws.
The time has come, therefore, for a new type of international treaty on
data protection. 260 At the 1997 International Privacy Conference in Mont-
real, the Quebec organizers proposed the creation of a new international pri-
vacy organization, an international privacy secretariat.261 The goal was to
move toward a more coordinated international response to information pri-
vacy divergence. The real problem, however, is not lack of convergence on
First Principles, but instead the lack of harmonization on democratic govern-
ance norms for information privacy.
Rather than the establishment of an international privacy secretariat
composed of interested participants, data protection needs an intergovern-
mental "General Agreement on Information Privacy" (GAIP) that includes a
large number and wide range of signatory countries. GAIP should focus on
establishing an institutional process of norm development designed to facili-
tate in the near term the coexistence of differing regimes, and over time pro-
mote harmonization of governing standards for information privacy.
The GATT compromise in 1947 offers a useful model for this first step
toward effective international cooperation. After the failure of the Havana
Charter to create an International Trade Organization, the resulting GATT
was as important originally for the establishment of an institutional mecha-
nism that allowed countries to address trade disputes as it was for the sub-
stantive reductions in tariffs and quotas. 262 Like the GATT concept in 1947,
the GAIP treaty should recognize basic principles of data protection and cre-
ate a high-level negotiating forum for consensus-based decisions. By insti-
tutionalizing such negotiations in a multilateral setting, two important data
protection objectives may be achieved. First, counterparts for data protection
policy discussions will be clearly designated even in countries without ex-
259. See Mayer-Schonberger, supra note 2, at 233 (discussing various European laws impos-
ing forms of mandatory legal protection).
260. Although the Council of Europe Convention has had some success as an international
treaty on data protection, the instrument lacks a sufficiently broad range of signatories and has not
achieved the degree of harmonization necessary for information flows in the online world to func-
tion effectively. Twenty countries have ratified the Council of Europe Convention for the Protec-
tion of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data. See Chart of Signatures
and Ratifications, Feb. 11, 1999 <http'/i/wvv.coe.fr/tablconv/108t.htm>. Most notable among the
signatory absences is the United States. Since the United States is unlikely to agree in the near term
to an obligatory set of data protection principles as a result of its liberal, market approach, the
Council of Europe Convention will not be able to expand effectively.
261. See Raymond Doray, A Word From the President of the Conference, in PRIVACY: THE
NEw FRONTIER, PROGRAM BOOK OF ABSTRACTS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
PRIVACY 5 (Sept 1997).
262. See WTO, Roots: from Havana to Marrakesh <http://www.wto.orgwtolaboutfacts4.
htm#GATT>.
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isting data protection authorities. This applies specifically to the United
States where data privacy issues rotate almost indiscriminately among differ-
ent government agencies depending on the interests of particular people at
the agencies.263 Second, expansive representation and regular negotiations
can predictably lead to increased consensus over time on necessary stan-
dards. The GATT evolution toward the Uruguay Round accords and the
adoption of the GATT 1994 illustrate this latter trend. Between 1948 and
1994, GATT was tremendously successful in liberalizing world trade and
including new concepts such as intellectual property and services within the
global mercantile system.264 Moreover, the diversity of countries represented
in GATT afforded developing countries and less-powerful countries a better
chance to influence trade issues in the multilateral framework than they
would have had on a bilateral basis.265 The resulting accords would have
stronger consensus around the world.
Beyond a mere model, the World Trade Organization (WTO), successor
to the GATT, offers a useful launching point for the GAIP. The WTO has an
institutional mechanism to study and negotiate new trade issues. Every two
years, WTO members must convene a ministerial-level conference to review
and examine world trade, including trade in global services.266 Although
pursuing a WTO strategy places data protection in the trade arena rather than
a political arena, WTO increasingly faces the incorporation noneconomic
values in trade policy.267 The risk of placing GAIP within the WTO trade
framework is that the WTO has an inherent bias toward liberal, market
norms; GATT and the WTO are founded on the principle of free trade and
market economies.2 68 The typical remedies for a violation of WTO princi-
ples are trade sanctions rather than private damages or injunctions to vindi-
cate personal rights. Nonetheless, the breadth of membership in WTO and
the growing recognition at WTO that social values such as workers' rights
and environmental issues are intrinsically linked to trade will blend govern-
263. See Gellman, supra note 53, at 237 (describing the agencies that have had general or in-
temational privacy policy responsibilities).
264. See WTO, Roots: front Havana to Marrakesh, supra note 262.
265. See id. at 5 ("Developing countries and other less powerful participants have a greater
chance of influencing the multilateral system in a trade round than in bilateral relationships with
major trading nations.').
266. See AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 229, at
art IV; WTO, The Trade Policy Review Mechanism <http:llvww.wto.orgwtolreviewstprrn.htm>
(explaining the regular review process for signatory countries that includes services).
267. Environmental and labor/workers rights issues were topics of discussion at the Seattle
Ministerial Conference. See WTO, Seattle: What's at Stake? Concerns... And Responses <http://
www.wto.orglwtolministl/stak e_6.htm>. Despite the protests and controversy surrounding the
Seattle Ministerial Conference, these social issues remain at the forefront of international trade
discussions.
268. See SWIE & LiTAN, supra note 10, at 195-96 (discussing the WTO as a forum for ne-
gotiating privacy concerns).
May 2000] 1361
HeinOnline  -- 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1361 1999-2000
STANFORD LAWREVFEW
ance ideologies.269 Noneconomic values will bring non-market based gov-
ernance norms to WTO. This is likely to happen with or without GAIP ne-
gotiations in a WTO context. Indeed, in the context of information flows,
this transformation has already begun. The WTO accords expressly recog-
nize privacy as a value that can override the free flow of information princi-
ple enshrined in the annex agreement on services.270 The significance of
putting GAIP before the WTO is, thus, twofold. First, the WTO framework
offers an institutional process with wide membership. Second, while the in-
stitution leans toward market-based norms, the incorporation of GAIP within
the WTO along with other noneconomic values will transplant social-
protection norms to the trade arena. In effect, this transplantation will pro-
mote convergence of governance norms.
VI. STRATEGIES FOR CO-ORDINATION AND COOPERATION
For transplantation and convergence to occur in the context of First Prin-
ciples, a map of strategies and partners is needed to inform and promote
coregulation and eventual consensus on the governance issues related to the
protection of personal information in data transfers. Since the release of the
proposal for the European Data Protection Directive in 1990, Europe has
shaped the debate and agenda for international privacy issues.27I Strategies
and alliances must, therefore, start with the international political dimensions
of Internet data flows. Moreover, Europe has well-established and active
national regulatory agencies for data protection. These data protection com-
missions are, thus, at the heart of the movement building a deeper consensus
on the integration of First Principles in different countries.
A. Political Dimensions
The political dimensions are at a critical stage for international data
flows. The European Union has taken a strong rhetorical position in favor of
the examination of foreign data protection rules and in support of embargoes
269. See WTO, Director-General's Message: Seattle Ministerial Conference Must Deliver
for the Poorest, Says Moore <http:llwww.wto.orglwto/ministl/02dg_.e.htm> (quoting WTO
Director-General Michael Moore noting the importance of considering environmental and labor
issues in the next trade negotiating round).
270. See General Agreement on Trade in Services, supra note 230, at annex 1B, art. XIV(c)
(ii).
271. See, e.g., Bennett, supra note 2, at 108-14 (describing the impact of the European Data
Protection Directive on the policies of states that have not passed similar measures); Priscilla M.
Regan, American Business and the European Data Protection Directive: Lobbying Strategies and
Tactics, in VISIONS OF PRIVACY, supra note 51, at 199, 200-01 (describing the reaction of U.S.
industry to the European Data Protection Directive); Samuelson, supra note 76, at 751-52 (describ-
ing the reasons why American lawyers will have to become familiar vith the emerging body of
information privacy law).
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of data going to destinations with inadequate levels of protection.72 But, the
European Union faces many challenges to the strict enforcement of these
rules. The Member States are likely to have different views on particular
cases, and Europe does not appear to seek an impenetrable data fortress.273
Internal or national political realities also have consequences for interna-
tional data flows. Within Europe, for example, the transposition of the Euro-
pean Data Protection Directive into Member State law illustrates the political
fluidity of data protection.24 Bureaucratic squabbles and political maneu-
vering will determine the specific outcomes of transposition and will set the
tone for each country's international posture.275 Outside of Europe, these
"turf' battles will be particularly acute in countries without data protection
authorities, like the United States. Where there is no existing data protection
authority, differing government agencies are likely to fight over jurisdiction
and hence power.276 Compromises are likely to result in a series of agencies
having pieces of responsibility for data protection policy. In addition, as
seen in the United States, industry lobbyists are likely to promote agencies
such as the U.S. Department of Commerce, Which are traditionally more
272. See European Data Protection Directive, supra note I 1, at art. 25; Brlhann, supra note
120.
273. See, e.g., Letter from Fred H. Cate, Robert E. Litan, Joel R. Reidenberg, Paul M.
Schwartz & Peter P. Swire to the Ambassador David L. Aaron, Undersecretary for International
Trade, U.S. Dep't of Commerce (Nov. 17, 1998) <http://wwv.acs.ohio-state.edu/units/lav/swirel/
DOCCOMME.htm> (noting that the U.S. Commerce Department's Draft International Safe Harbor
Privacy Principles, although designed to comply with EU data privacy policy, fails to meet E.U.
data privacy standards on several important points).
274. As of July 1999, nine Member States (France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Germany,
the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, Spain, and Austria) had failed to transpose the Directive
into national law and received a formal warning from the European Commission. See European
Commission, Data protection: Commission Decides to Send Reasoned Opinions to Nine Member
States, July 29, 1999 <http://europa.eu.int/commldgl5/en/medialdataprot/news/99-592.htm>.
275. In France, for example, the Braibant Report issued in March of 1998 on the transposition
of the European Directive into French law has led to various public discussions. See Donn~es per-
sonnelles et societ6 de l'information: Rapport au Premier Ministre sur la transposition en droit fran-
gais de la directive no. 95/46, Mar. 3, 1998 <http://www.premier-ministre.gouv.fr/PM/
RAPPORTSI.HTM#1> (linking to the Bmibant Report). But, there is still no bill before the Par-
liament. See Ministry of Economy, Finance, and Industry, Policy Paper on the Adaptation of the
Legal Framei ork [sic] the Information Society, at § 1.6 (Oct. 1999) <http:llwww.finances.gouv.fr/
societe.information/anglaislchapitrel-ang.hm>.
276. In the United States, there is a musical chairs approach to agency responsibility for in-
formation privacy policy. See, e.g., Geliman, supra note 53. Interest has rotated among the OMB,
NTIA, USTR, FCC, FTC, the State Department, and the Commerce Department. At the moment,
the FTC seems to be taking the lead on privacy issues. In 1998, the Clinton Administration estab-
lished an office within the bureaucratic layers of the OMB and Professor Swire was appointed to
the post. See Declan McCullagh & James Glave, Clinton Tabs Privacy Point Man, WIRED NEWS,
Mar. 3, 1999 <http:llwww.wired.com/news/news/politics/story/18249.html>. The position does
not, however, have policymaking authority and Professor Swire's precise role in privacy issues
remains unclear. See Shaffer, supra note 129, at 62-63.
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sympathetic to the interests of industry than of individuals.277 These political
alignments will complicate efforts for international cooperation.
Yet, despite the political flux, each of the European Union Member
States has an existing data protection agency. These regulators will seek to
define their institutional place in the further development of international
norms. Since they form an important elite community of poiicymakers,28
they will strive for an active role.
B. Roles ofData Protection Commissions
As the instruments and institutions affecting international data flows and
the protection of personal information evolve, data protection authorities will
have a vital role in the resolution of international conflicts. Data protection
authorities can act as emissaries for fair information practices, but also serve
as advocates for the rights of individuals in the tradition of their socially-
protective governance norms. These two key strategies and their corre-
sponding partners offer data protection authorities a powerful means to pro-
mote convergence on socially-protective norms for international data flows.
1. Emissary strategy.
The emissary strategy consists of representing the socially-protective ap-
proach in a variety of international contexts. By exposing and highlighting
fair information practice standards with different governmental and nongov-
ernmental partners at the international level, data protection authorities can
reduce misunderstandings, find ways to enable the peaceful coexistence of
national data protection approaches, and move toward consensus on execu-
tion of First Principles. Three types of partners are critical to this endeavor:
data protection authorities themselves, foreign governments, and interna-
tional organizations.
International cooperation among data protection authorities is well es-
tablished on both formal and informal levels. The annual Commissioners'
meeting,279"the regular meetings of the International Working Group on Data
Protection in Telecommunications (the Berlin Group),280 and the quarterly
277. See PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES,
AND PUBLIC POLICY 78 (1995) (noting the early opposition to privacy regulation by the U.S. De-
partment of Commerce).
278. See BENNETT, supra note 10, at 127-29 (describing how these policymakers separately
lobby their governments to effect change).
279. See, e.g., PROC. XXI INT'L CONF., supra note 44.
280. The International Working Group on Data Protection in Telecommunications was estab-
lished by the Berlin Data Privacy Commissioner. For information about their activities, see Inter-
national Working Group on Data Protection in Telecommunications <http:/www.datenschutz-
berlin.deldoc/intliwgdptlindex.htm>.
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sessions of European commissioners under the auspices of the Article 29
Working Party28l each reflect organized efforts to promote shared data pro-
tection interests among national authorities. More informally, direct contacts
among Commissioners and discussions at prominent international confer-
ences such as the annual conference organized by Privacy Laws & Business
at the University of Cambridge82 also serve an important role in coordinat-
ing resources and expertise.
Yet, these emissary contacts should move to the next stage and exploit
new opportunities to promote international consensus. Emissaries can take
collective policy positions that advance the understanding of fair information
practices for international data flows. The Berlin Group and the Article 29
Working Party have begun to issue such declarations and interpretations of
data protection principles. 283 These documents help set and define the inter-
national agenda. Future Data Protection Commissioners' Conferences
should issue final substantive declarations at the conclusion of the Commis-
sioners' annual private session.284 Such a strategy would focus preparatory
work by the host Commission and promote consensus among the data pro-
tection authorities. Over time, such declarations would build a strong and
clear set of standards for the execution of First Principles in the context of
international data flows.
However, since many countries around the world, including the United
States, do not have a national data protection agency, contacts between data
protection authorities and foreign governments must also be developed. A
number of data protection authorities have pursued this strategy with the
United States as has the European Commission.285 The strategy is a compli-
cated one because foreign government counterparts may not be stable. In the
United States, for example, each year seems to find a different government
agency in charge of the domestic privacy agenda. As many at the Commis-
sioners' conference have noted, when the U.S. government sends observers
281. See European Data Protection Directive, supra note 11, at art. 29.
282. See Privacy Laws & Business, Conferences <http:l/www.privacylaws.co.uk/conferences.
htn>.
283. See International Working Group on Data Protection in Telecommunications, supra note
280, at I (listing declarations of the Berlin Group and links to texts); European Comm., Documents
Adopted by the Data Protection Working Party <http"//europa.eu.int/comm/intemal-marketen/
media/dataprot/wpdocs/index.htm>.
284. See Joel R. Reidenberg, International Data transfers and methods to strengthen interna-
tional cooperation, in PROC. XXTH INT'L CONF. DATA PROT. COMM'RS (1998) <http:/Ihome.
spryneLcom/-reidenberg/idLhtm> (arguing for a final conference declaration); Declaration on
Privacy and the Internet of the European Privacy Commissioners and Iceland, Nonvay and Swit-
zerland <http:llwww.cnil.frlactulcommuniclactu6.htm> (common position taken at the conclusion
of the conference by many of the commissioners).
285. In particular, negotiations are underway between the European Commission and the U.S.
Department of Commerce to try to find a "safeharbor" policy for the U.S. to qualify for interna-
tional data transfers under the European Directive. See Letter from Ambassador David L. Aaron to
Colleagues (Nov. 15, 1999) <http://www.ita.doe.gov/tdlecomaaronmemol 199.htm>.
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to the annual meeting, there is little continuity in either the staff or the U.S.
government agency being represented. 286
Since several different government offices in many countries may have
jurisdiction over data protection matters, data protection authorities risk be-
ing caught in the internal disputes of foreign government bureaucracies.
This makes emissary contacts more elusive, but no less critical. If a coun-
try's internal data protection policy apparatus is not stable, the potential for
international conflicts multiplies. Data protection authorities will need to
seek the assistance of their own government offices to sort out some of the
diplomatic issues and identify the key domestic policy players.
As the traditional institutions of data protection (the OECD and the
Council of Europe) seek to expand their role in international conflict resolu-
tion and as the new entrants (the WTO and the WIPO) begin to address fair
information practice issues,2 87 data protection authorities can offer valuable
expertise and insight, while ensuring that their perspectives are not lost. This
will be a particularly critical role since the new entrants tend to approach
data protection from the perspective of liberal governance norms. The emis-
sary strategy with international organizations will, in essence, help frame
these organizations' agendas for international cooperation.
Nevertheless, the avenues for input at most of these organizations are not
familiar to data protection authorities. For the OECD, the WTO, and the
WIPO, it is typically commerce departments or finance or economic minis-
tries that coordinate national participation. Data protection authorities will
need to vigilantly participate on country delegations to these fora. In con-
trast, at the Council of Europe, foreign affairs ministries are more active and
data protection authorities have had regular channels of participation. These
must continue.
2. Advocacy strategy.
In addition to the emissary strategy, data protection agencies should pur-
sue an advocacy strategy that involves the active promotion of specific exe-
cution standards of First Principles. Paradoxically for international
cooperation, this strategy may be confrontational at times. Confrontation can
facilitate ascertaining whether differences on issues are slight or fundamen-
tal. Where the differences are fundamental, advocacy may force compro-
mises and solutions. This advocacy strategy for data protection agencies
applies to three types of counterparts: foreign governments, technical or-
286. For example, at the 1992 Commissioners' Conference, a representative from the State
Department attended as the U.S. observer;, at the 1998 conference, the United States sent a repre-
sentative from the NTIA (an agency of the U.S. Department of Commerce) and at the 1999 confer-
ence, a representative from the OMB participated.
287. See text accompanying notes 229-236 supra.
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ganizations, and foreign organizations (e.g., companies and trade associa-
tions).
The advocacy strategy is clearly in progress between the United States
and Europe over the implementation of Articles 25 and 26 of the European
Data Protection Directive and its equivalents in national laws.288 Since the
start of the process to adopt the European Data Protection Directive, the in-
ternational agenda on specific data protection standards has largely been set
by the European Union and several of the Member State data protection
authorities. By setting a minimum threshold of protection as a condition for
data exports from Europe, the Directive along with the prior law in several of
the Member States embodies a strong position against data havens and a po-
tentially confrontational position with respect to non-European Union gov-
ernments.
In response, the American position for the past eight years has been
largely defensive. At first, the U.S. government firmly asserted that Ameri-
can data protection was equal to that in Europe. Europeans had access to
unfiltered sources of information about the U.S. system and were not per-
suaded.289 Continued European advocacy pushed the U.S. government to try
to justify reliance on self-regulation. This example illustrates that the con-
frontational risk of transborder data flow restrictions has worked as an effec-
tive negotiating tool and that the agenda-setting function is a particularly
valuable aspect of the advocacy strategy.
The advocacy strategy is particularly important to influence the work oc-
curring in technical organizations such as W3C, the International Organiza-
tion for Standards (ISO), the Internet Society (ISOC), and IANA. Too often,
data protection authorities ignore technical discussions. While the Berlin
Group took an important step by becoming involved in consultations with
W3C over a privacy transmission protocol, this input appears more in an ad-
288. Since November 1998, the U.S. Department of Commerce and the Directorate General
XV of the European Commission have been negotiating the evaluation of U.S. data privacy under
the "adequacy" criteria of Art. 25 of the European Directive. The Working Party established under
Article 29 of the European Directive, which is composed of representatives from each of the na-
tional regulatory authorities, has insisted on strong protections from the U.S. side. See Working
Party Established Under Art. 29 of Directive 951461EC, Opinion 1/99 Concerning the Level ofData
Protection in the United States and the Ongoing Discussions Between the European Commission
and the United States Government, E.C. Doc. DG XV 5092/98 WP 15 (Jan. 26, 1999) <http://
europa.eu.int/comm/intemal market/enlmedia/dataprotlvpdocslwpl5en.htm> Working Party Es-
tablished Under Art. 29 of Directive 951461EC, Opinion 2/99 on the Adequacy of the "International
Safe Harbor Principles" Issued by the US. Department of Commerce on 19th April 1999, E.C.
Doc. DG XV 5047199 WP 19 (May 3, 1999) <http://europa.eu.int/comm/internaImarket/en/
media/dataprotlwpdocslwpl9en.htm>; Working Party Established Under Art. 29 of Directive
951461EC, Opinion 4/99 on the Frequently Asked Questions to Be Issued by the U.S. Department of
Commerce in Relation to the Proposed "Safe Harbor Principles" on the Adequacy of the "Interna-
tional Safe Harbor Principles," E.C. Doe. DG XV 5066199 WP 21 (June 7, 1999)
<http:lleuropa.eu.intlcommlintemal-marketenmedialdataprotwpdocswp2len.htm>.
289. See Spiros Sinitis, Foreivord, in SCHWARTZ& REIDENBERG supra note 9, at viii-ix.HeinOnline  -- 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1367 1999-2000
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visory role than an advocacy role.290 As advocates, data protection authori-
ties can insist on certain standards or technical capabilities as a prerequisite
to the permissible use of the technology for processing personal informa-
tion.291 France, for example, used this approach with the providers of soft-
ware for airline reservation systems and incorporated this strategy in the
1996 Telecommunications Law that imposes liability on service providers
who fail to offer content filtering capabilities to their Internet service sub-
scribers.292
Nonetheless, the Berlin Group's involvement in technical fora seems ex-
ceptional. Such involvement is not a priority of many data protection
authorities. For example, the data protection authorities were hardly in-
volved while the structure of the Internet domain name system was re-
organized.293 These policy debates in technical areas offered a significant
opportunity to build specific data protection options into the architecture of
the Internet. The name system could be structured to both assure anonymity
of personal information and to enable the application of data protection prin-
ciples to online activities. In other areas of technical standardization there
are significant opportunities to make anonymous use of the Internet more
accessible or to establish data protection icons, like a logo, that might reflect
particular substantive rules, policies, and practices. Similarly, technical
standards that enable automation devices to bridge differences across data
protection rules could be developed. For example, protocols might be used
to automate compliance with different notice requirements such as prerequi-
site disclosures and different consent mechanisms.
One of the explanations for the hesitance of data protection authorities in
the technical arena is that this advocacy strategy changes the personnel dy-
namic within data protection agencies. Agency staff need greater technical
expertise. In particular, staffers must be as comfortable speaking of "meta-
290. See Internet Working Group on Data Protection in Telecommunications, Commnon Posi-
tion on Essentials for Privacy-Enhancing Technologies (e.g. P3P) on the WorldWideWeb (Apr. 15,
1998) <http://v vw.datenschutz-berlin.deldoc/intiwgdptpriv-en.htrm> (setting forth broad objec-
tives that any privacy protocol should meet).
291. See, &g., IWGDPT, Report and Guidance, supra note 242, at 4 (In many instances the
decision to enter the Internet and how to use it is subject to legal conditions under national data
protection law.").
292. Law No. 96-659 of July 26, 1996, art. 15, .0., July 27, 1996, p. 11384, 11395.
293. As ICANN and the WIPO have outlined rules for the collection and dissemination of
domain name registry information, data protection commissioners have remained silent. Professor
Michael Froonkin, as the "public interest representative" to a panel of experts convened by the
WIPe, singlehandedly brought the privacy issue onto the table in his stinging critique of the early
draft of the WIP0 guidance. See A. Michael Froomkin, A Critique of WIPO's RFC3 Ver. 1.0a
(Mar. 14, 1999) <http://www.law.miami.edut-amf/critique.htm> (describing initial proposals as
"zero privacy"); WIPe, Panel of Experts <http:llecommerce.wipo.intldomains/processlengl
experts.htmlj (listing Prof. Froomkin as consulted expert).
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tags" as they are thinking about "purpose specifications." This shift is neces-
sary, but likely to be difficult for some agencies.
In any case, without a strong advocacy strategy from data protection
authorities, technical organizations and their clients are unlikely to imple-
ment standards in a manner that actively promotes basic principles of data
protection. W3C provides a useful illustration of the resistance. The tech-
nology for filtering Internet content as well as privacy practices has been
available for almost four years.294 The Platform for Internet Content Selec-
tion (PICS) began at W3C as a response to Congressional interest in prohib-
iting children's access to offensive material on the Internet and was
developed as a transmission protocol to enable content labeling and filtering.
The same technology can be applied to match Web site privacy policies with
visitor privacy preferences; W3C began to develop this application, Platform
for Privacy Preferences (P3P), in 1996. Yet, to date, neither PICS nor P3P
have settled standards and wide-spread acceptance. And, the P3P effort is
essentially a U.S.-Ied exercise. In the absence of an advocacy strategy with a
few confrontations, the incentive structure does not exist for the technical
organizations to focus on the international dimensions of national standards
and companies have little real incentive to implement privacy technologies
that adequately secure citizens' rights.
In many countries without data protection agencies, like the United
States, the advocacy strategy plays a critical role in persuading foreign or-
ganizations to adopt standards of fair information practice. Communications
from data protection authorities to foreign organizations such as companies
or trade associations fill the gaps where data protection authorities have no
counterpart. The effectiveness of this strategy is demonstrated by the Euro-
pean Commission's dialog with U.S. business groups. Many U.S. industries
and companies have developed data protection programs during the last sev-
eral years largely in response to the perceived threat from the European Data
Protection Directive.295
The expansion of direct advocacy to foreign organizations offers a means
for data protection authorities to assure execution of First Principles for in-
ternational data flows. As advocates, data protection officials can use con-
frontations over transborder data flow prohibitions to find solutions such as
contracts stipulating liability of exporters like the Citibank/Bahncard exam-
294. FTC, Public Workshop on Consumer Privacy on the Global Information Infrastructure
(June 4, 1996) <http://www.fle.gov/bcplprivary/wkshp96/pw960604.pdf> (statement of Paul Res-
nick, AT&T Research) (describing the possibility of adapting PICS for information privacy protec-
tion).
295. See, ag., Trans Atlantic Business Dialogue, Statement of Conclusions (1999) <http://
www.tabd.org/recom/berlin.html> (discussing industry protection of personal data for e-
commerce); U.S. Council for International Business, Privacy Diagnostic (1998) <http://www.uscib.
orglpolicylprivmin.htm> (offering tool for companies to develop privacy policies that facilitate
transborder data flows).
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ple in Germany.296 In the long term, direct advocacy to foreign organizations
is likely to lead to increased participation by the governments of those coun-
tries and an increasing centralization of data protection policy in those coun-
tries. This will, in turn, promote the establishment of a counterpart for
discussions with existing foreign data protection authorities. This is starting
to occur in the United States. With the emphasis from Europe on interna-
tional data protection, the Clinton administration created a Chief Counselor
for Privacy in the OMB.297 Ironically, the practical effect returns the focus to
the convergence of governance norms: Centralization of data privacy policy
is anchored in socially-protective norms rather than liberal, market norms.
Thus, the advocacy strategy promotes international convergence of govern-
ance norms for the protection of information privacy.
CONCLUSION
This article makes a number of claims about the nature of information
privacy rules and their variation across borders. First, the article claims that
a global convergence exists in democracies on First Principles, a core set of
standards for fair information practice. But, divergence in the execution of
those principles both in approach to law and interpretation of law remains
significant. Second, the article argues that the nature of these divergences
runs much deeper than differences in legal systems and goes to the core
norms of a democratic society's organization regarding choices about the
role of the state, market, and citizen in society. Liberal, market norms of
democratic organization lead to different expressions of information privacy
rules than socially-protective norms.
International data flows on the Internet force these divergent rules to
confront each other with increasing frequency. The claim that divergences
draw on different governance norms means that privacy conflicts will only
be resolved by finding compatibility points or by convergence of those very
governance norms. Starting with a search for compatibility, the article de-
velops a theory for coregulation and highlights both strategies and methods
for data protection authorities to promote international data flows through
multinational coordination and cooperation. None of the instruments and
strategies are mutually exclusive. To the contrary, they collectively form an
important basis to strengthen international convergence on the execution of
First Principles. Indeed, these are methods to steer privacy.298 Paradoxi-
296. See Dix, supra note 4 (describing the requirement of the Berlin Privacy Commission for
Citibank to execute a data privacy contract with its German affiliate prior to the transfer of credit
card data to the United States).
297. See James Glave, Privacy's Protector Makes Debut, WIRED NEWS, Mar. 5, 1999
<http://www.wired.conlnews/politics/0,1283,18301,00.html>.
298. Charles D. Raab, From Balancing to Steering: New Directions for Data Protection, il
VISIONS OF PRIVACY, supra note 51, at 83-88.
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cally, if coregulation facilitates information privacy on global networks, then
the increasing and successful contact between different systems should lead
to legal transplantation-the incorporation by one legal system of rules de-
veloped in another system.299 In effect, this will become a force of conver-
gence for governance norms. To the extent that countries adopt information
privacy mechanisms from other democracies, they will also be adopting
philosophies about the role of states, citizens, and markets in society. In the
long term, privacy issues may turn out to drive a global convergence on gov-
ernance norms for the Information Society.
299. See Alan Watson, Aspects of Reception of Law, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 335, 335 (1996)
(discussing four forces affecting legal transplants: (1) extreme practical utility; (2) chance; (3)
difficulty of clear sight; and (4) the need for authority).
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